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ARTI CL ES
The Anticipation Misconception
Colin P Marks,
INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE that your client calls to obtain advice regarding the adequacy of
the warnings and instructions on a new medical product prior to releasing
the product on the market. After reviewing the product, its warnings, and
background information, you prepare drafts of a memorandum and make
numerous notes to yourself regarding the possible legal liability associated
with the product. Finally, you send the client a memorandum outlining
your thoughts and advice for reducing litigation risks. Some years later,
litigation arises surrounding the product and the plaintiffs request to
see the memorandum you prepared regarding potential liability, as well
as any notes and materials used to create such memorandum. Your client
refuses to produce the requested memorandum and materials on the
grounds that they are protected by both the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine. Although the memorandum may seem to be
clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege, does the work product
doctrine truly apply? And are the attorney's notes, drafts, and research
trails that were not shared with the client protected under the work
product doctrine? The likely answer to these questions is "no" simply by
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virtue of the fact that they may not be deemed to have been prepared in
"anticipation of litigation," as that term is often interpreted as litigation
being more than a remote possibility.' Confusion is added to the analysis
as there is disagreement about whether the materials sought must be
created in preparation of litigation or if it is permissible that some other
business purpose also played a role in their creation, the latter being
excluded under the term "anticipation of litigation" in some jurisdictions.
Many commentators and courts have cited to the Supreme Court
decision of Hickman v. Taylor as the genesis of the work product doctrine
and the requirement that to be afforded protection the material in question
must be generated "in anticipation of litigation."' The oft quoted policy
justification for the protection afforded is that attorneys should be allowed
a "zone of privacy" within which to prepare their case for the client.'
This justification supports limiting protection to only work generated "in
anticipation of litigation" because, presumably, outside of this context there
2 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603-04 (8th Cir. 1977) (em-
phasizing that "anticipation of litigation" is the keystone to work product protection, and
denying work product protection to a document that was clearly opinion work product but
prepared before litigation was anticipated).
3 See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, The Power of Privilege and the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act: How Corporate America has Everyone ExcitedAbout the Emperor's New Clothes, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 979,987 n.36 (2008) ("[Tlhe work-product doctrine provides additional protection for
the work product of an attorney made in anticipation of litigation.") (citing Hickman v.Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 508, 511-12 (947)); Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3 d 1143, 1148
(9 th Cir. 2008); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 516 F3d 1235, 1263
(I ith Cir. 2oo8); Reg'1 Airport Auth. of Louisville v. LFG, L.L.C., 460 F3d 697, 713 (6th Cir.
2oo6); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F 3 d 511, 520 (6th Cit. 2oo6); Grace United Methodist
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F3d 643, 668 (1oth Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Oct. 22, 2001, 282 F.3d 156, 16o (2d Cir. 2002); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3 d 910, 9 24 (8th Cir. 1997); Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl.
709, 721 (Fed. Cl. 2007); AAB joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444-45 (Fed.
Cl. 2007); Cabot v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 442, 445 (Fed. Cl. 1996); Keith Paul Bishop, The
McNulty Memo - Continuing the Disappointment, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 729, 731 n. 1o (2007); Thomas
C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post--SOX Environment,
86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 94 n.348 (2007); Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond
the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295 (2oo6); Latieke M. Lyles, Comment, Cooperation or
Coercion?: Why Selective Waiver is Needed in Government Investigations, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1291,
1297 (2oo8).
4 Hobley v. Burge, 433 E3 d 946, 949 (7 th Cit. 2oo6) (identifying the purpose of the work
product doctrine as establishing a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze their case "free
from ... interference by an adversary"); Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 372 F3 d 286, 292
(4th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the work product doctrine "serves to provide a zone of privacy
within which to plan . . . [for a] case" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Adlman, 134 E3 d I194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating the purpose of the work
product doctrine is "to preserve a zone of privacy in which" an attorney can prepare his or her
case); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 784, 789 (Fed. Cl. 2oo6) (asserting that
the work product doctrine is "intended to preserve a zone of privacy [where an attorney] can
prepare and develop legal strategy"); see United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F2d 1285,
1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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is no need for the "zone of privacy." However, a closer reading of Hickman
reveals that although the facts of that case involved preparation for trial, the
Supreme Court placed no such limit on the scope of protection afforded
an attorney's "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories,"
known as "core" work product.' In fact, the Supreme Court made very
clear that such materials should be afforded special protection, above and
beyond that afforded "ordinary" work product, which includes "written or
oral information transmitted to the attorney and recorded as conveyed by
the client."' Furthermore, although the Court utilized the "zone of privacy"
justification, it also articulated a much broader concern for the effect
discovery of such materials would have on the attorney-client relationship.
This policy concern shares much in common with the policy
justification that is at the heart of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, a
review of Hickman reveals at least two commonly held misconceptions
about the case: (1) that it requires core work product to be produced in
"anticipation of litigation" before protection can attach and (2) that the
sole justification for the protection is to create a "zone of privacy" within
which the attorney can work. Together, these misconceptions have
produced problems that should be of concern to both the practitioner
and academic. From a practical standpoint, these misconceptions have
limited the scope of coverage given to the attorney's core work product
causing problems with knowing which items in the attorney's file will
be discoverable. Furthermore, as different jurisdictions have adopted
varying standards, attorneys must deal with a lack of uniformity when it
comes to protecting work product. Academically, these misconceptions are
troubling because they have resulted in a system that encourages forum
shopping and creates distinctions without any meaning or justification.
This article examines both the work product doctrine's historical and
philosophical roots to determine whether the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement should be a bar to the protection of core work product from
discovery. Part I examines the current state of the work product doctrine
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") 26(b)(3) and
case law and compares the doctrine with the attorney-client privilege. Part
I concludes by demonstrating how core work product can be discovered
despite the protection of these two doctrines. Part II examines the Hickman
v. Taylor case within its historical context, starting with the enactment of
the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and concluding with an
analysis of the Court's decision itself. Part III discusses the subsequent
interpretations of Hickman v. Taylor and how the "anticipation of litigation"
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)( 3 ); see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
6 Advance Publ'ns, Inc. v. United States (In re Antitrust Grand Jury), 805 F.2d 155, 163
(6th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 Fzd 793, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Doe v. United
States (In re Doe), 662 F2d 1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re
Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 64o F.2d 49, 63 (7 th Cir. 1980)).
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requirement, or anticipation misconception, got its start through, of all
things, a student note in the Harvard Law Review. Part III concludes with
a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretations of Rule 26(b) as it
currently exists.
Finally, Part IV examines the "anticipation of litigation" requirement
in light of this historical development and proposes that the requirement
is unjustified historically, philosophically, and as a matter of policy. Part
IV, therefore, proposes that a new exception be established with regard to
core work product, or rather recognition that an old exception continues
to exist. This exception, based upon Hickman, would afford core work
product a residuum of protection from discovery regardless of the context
in which it was created, so long as an attorney created it in his or her role of
providing legal assistance. Such an exception to discovery would grant core
work product a privileged status similar to that received by attorney-client
communications, a result that makes sense when the instrumental policy
justification for the doctrine is taken into account. Recognition of this
protection will be more in keeping with the holding of Hickman and will
help dispel uncertainty as to the scope of the doctrine due to the various
readings courts have given to the term "anticipation of litigation."
I. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Before delving into the historical and philosophical underpinnings of
the work product doctrine, a brief overview of the doctrine as it stands today
is necessary to demonstrate how the anticipation of litigation requirement
can be problematic. Because parties often seek to protect material under
both the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, a brief
review of the attorney-client privilege is in order as well as a discussion
of how these protections differ. Although these doctrines cover slightly
different materials, their philosophical underpinnings actually have much
in common.
A. Work Product Doctrine Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)
1. The Scope of Work ProductProtection.-In short, the work product doctrine
grants a qualified privilege to the work product of a party or its agents.'
While the work product doctrine in the civil context has its roots in the
1946 United States Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor, today the
7 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 474 (1996) (citations omitted); Chiasson v.
Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 988 E2d 513, 514 n.2 (5th Cit. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d '414, 1429 (3d Cir. 199) (citation omitted); Jeff A. Anderson et al.,
The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV.760. 762 n.I (1983); Charles M.Yablon & Steven
S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman: Protection for Corporate Work Product?, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
627, 633 (1998) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 99I2
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Hickman decision has been partially codified in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3):'
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But,
subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare
its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial
equivalent by other means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those
materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.9
The rule has been summarized as giving a qualified privilege to materials
that are "(1) documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable; (2)
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3) by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative."10 Though the first of
these elements only speaks in terms of "documents and tangible things,"
the protection also is afforded to intangible things, such as the recollections
of an attorney or party requested through an interrogatory, via the original
Hickman decision."
The second requirement that work product be "prepared in anticipation
of litigation" presents difficulties in interpretation. Courts have responded
to this by adopting a variety of approaches for when something actually
meets this criterion." As one commentator has noted, there appears to be,
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 2 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE VORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 795 (5 th ed. 2007). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
offer a similar protection through Rule 16(b)(2). FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2); EPSTEIN, supra, at
795. Though this article will focus on the civil rules, reference may be made at some points to
the work product doctrine in the criminal context.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
io EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 797 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)); see also Anderson et al.,
supra note 7, at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
ii In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig. 343 F3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (West 1994)); Duffy v. United
States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 473 F.2d 840, 845-46 (8th Cir. 1973); EPSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 8I5; Richard L. Marcus, The Story of Hickman: Preserving Adversarial Incentives While
Embracing Broad Discovery, in CivIL PROCEDURE STORIES 326, 349 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.,
2d ed. Foundation Press 2oo8); Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidencesoz: Stirringthe State
Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673,
app. at 762 (2009).
I 2 Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery, in
6 JAIMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.70(3)(a) (3 d ed. 2009) ("Courts have
201O-20I1I 13
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at its core, two factors required for work product protection to apply: "there
must be a threat of litigation and there must be a motivational component."13
As for the first factor, one issue that arises is whether the action threatened
qualifies as "litigation." The Federal Rules do not define "litigation," but
courts generally have broadened the term to apply beyond merely litigation
in federal district courts so as to extend to other "adversarial proceedings."I4
Documents prepared for compliance with federal securities laws have not
been afforded work product protection," nor have the notes of an attorney
taken during a conference call with the Food and Drug Administration
regarding the failure rate of a medical device because no investigation was
pending. 16 Similarly, documents prepared in anticipation of a governmental
investigation have not been granted work product protection," but once
a governmental investigation has actually commenced, the work product
doctrine may apply as the prospect of litigation is no longer remote.18
This leads to yet another problem with applying the work-product
doctrine: When is litigation "anticipated"? The term "anticipation" is also
not defined by the Federal Rules, leading courts again to apply various
standards. Analyzing whether work product was produced in anticipation
of litigation often requires an inquiry into the temporality of the threatened
adversarial proceeding and an inquiry into the motivational factor cited
above."As to the temporality of the litigation, the requirement is met when
a proceeding has actually been initiated; however, the doctrine does not
devised various formulations regarding just how concrete the prospect of litigation must be
before protection will attach to a given document."); Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 845.
13 EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 825 (citing Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., No. CIVA. 9 6-
2013 -GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at *1o (D. Kan. Jan. 7 1998)).
14 Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 ER.D. I, 4 (D.D.C. 2005); Deseret Mgmt. Corp. v. United
States, 76 Fed. Cl. 88, 92-93 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. h (2ooo)); EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 826-27; Jerold S. Solovy et al.,
Protecting Confidential Legal Information: A HandbookforAnalyzing Issues Under the Attorney Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, in INSURANCE COVERAGE 20o9: TRENDS AND LITIGATION
225, 491 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18542, 2009).
15 Biddison v. City of Chicago, No. 85 C 10295, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3991, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 3, 1989); EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 829-30.
16 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 156 (D. Mass. 2004).
17 Id. at 147 (citing Guzzino v. Felterman, 174 ER.D. 59,63 (W.D. La. 1997)).
18 Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491, 513 (D.N.H. 1996) (citations
omitted); see also In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.4 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 987 (3d Cir. 1980); Garrett V. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., No.95 CIV.24 o6 (PKL), 1996 WL 325725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996) (citing
Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F2d 1252, t261 (3d Cir. t993)).
19 EPSTEIN,supra note 8, at 836; Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 247 ER.D. 208, 210
(D.D.C. 2oo8) (citation omitted); United States ex rel. Fago v. M & T Mortg. Corp., 242 F.R.D.
16, 23 (D.D.C. 2007); Evans v. Atwood, 177 ER.D. I, 6 (D.D.C. 1997); Amway Corp. v. Procter
& Gamble Co., No. i: 9 8-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
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require that a suit be filed for the protection to apply.zo It is in this pre-suit
context that the temporality requirement is at its most chimerical. It is often
stated that the chance of litigation must be more than a mere possibility."
"In general ... a party must show more than a remote prospect, an inchoate
possibility, or a likely chance of litigation."" Courts, however, vary on the
level of temporality they will require, with some courts requiring a very high
level of imminence while others seem content with a much lesser degree.
For instance, some courts have interpreted in "anticipation of litigation"
to mean that protection will only extend to work product prepared "under
the supervision of an attorney in preparation for the real and imminent
threat of litigation or trial . . . ."2' However, other courts have quoted a
more liberal standard, requiring that there exist "a subjective belief that
litigation was a real possibility, and that belief must [be] objectively
reasonable," or an even less demanding standard that the alleged work
product was prepared "with an eye toward litigation."2 6 This variance in
the stringency of what qualifies as work product, due to when litigation is
''anticipated," has created a lack of uniformity across judicial districts and
has the undesirable effect of increasing the likelihood of forum shopping.
Even if the documents are prepared for an adversarial proceeding
qualifying as "litigation" and the temporality requirement is met, protection
will not be afforded if the motivation for creating the document was not
based upon the threatened litigation. For instance, many documents
may have been produced for a business purpose, as well as for litigation.
2o EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 837; United States v. Adlman, 134 F3 d 1194, 1200 (2d Cit.
1998); Grinnell Corp. v. fF Corp., 222 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Ad/man, 134 E3 d
at i2oo); Collins v. Mullins, 170 F.R.D. 132, 136 (W.D. Va. 1996) (citing Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26,43 (D. Md. 1974)).
21 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954)); Garfinkle v Arcata
Nat'l Corp., 64 FR.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); John M. Burman, 7he Work Product Doctrine,
Wyo. LAw., Apr. 2006, at I, 5 (citation omitted).
22 In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 183 (D.N.J. 2003) (citation and internal
quotations marks omitted).
23 Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 845-46; EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 850-5 1
24 Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-22oo-JWL-DJW, 2oo6 WL 266599, at
#ro (D. Kan. Feb. I, 2oo6); Banks v. United States, No. Co3 - 5 5 3 3 RJB, 2005 WL 974723, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2005) ("In determining whether documents were prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation, the court should consider whether the documents would not have been gen-
erated but for the pendency or imminence of litigation." (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
25 In re Sealed Case, 146 E3 d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Roxworthy,
457 F3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2oo6); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 E2d 1252,
1260 (3d Cit. 1993); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984
(4 th Cit. 1992).
26 United States v.Adlman, 134 E3 d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793,809 (D.C. Cit. 1982) (citing Hickman,
329 U.S. at 511).
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Such dual-purpose documents raise doubts as to whether the documents
were truly created in anticipation of litigation." There is a split between
circuits as to what is the correct degree of motivation required. The Fifth
Circuit has articulated a standard for "anticipation of litigation" whereby
the privilege can apply where litigation is not imminent, "as long as the
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to
aid in possible future litigation."" The Second Circuit, in United States v.
Adlman, rejected the "primary motivating purpose" test and instead opted
for the "because of' rule whereby "documents should be deemed prepared
in anticipation of litigation ... if in light of the nature of the document and
the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said
to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." 29
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is a direct adoption of the
standard advanced by Charles Wright and Arthur Miller in their treatise
Federal Practice and Procedure.3" Wright and Miller encourage adoption of
the "because of' standard, stating, "the test should be whether, in light
of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular
case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation."' Indeed, a number of circuits have
joined the Second Circuit in adopting this approach in varying contexts,
including the First," Third," Seventh,' Eighth,3  Ninth, 3 6 and D.C.
Circuits." The standard itself could be open to multiple interpretations,
however, and the courts have not created a uniform standard.
2. Production of Work Product Under Federal Rule 26(b)(3)(ii).-As
has already been noted, the work product doctrine is not an absolute
27 See, eg, Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco CO., 2oo F.R.D. 661, 674 (D. Kan. 2001)
(Stretching the concept of creation for a business purpose by finding that the defendant, R.J.
Reynolds, was in the business of litigation, and thus "documents prepared in the ordinary
course of that business of litigation without a tie to specific litigation are not protected by
work product immunity.").
28 United States v. Davis, 636 E2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). Butsee
In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 884; Roxworthy, 457 E3d at 594; Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino,
983 F.2d at 1260; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F.2d at 984.
29 Ad/man, 134 F.3d at 1202-03 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note II, § 2024).
30 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note II, § 2024.
31 Id.
32 Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F 3d 60, 68 (ist Cir. 2002).
33 Montgomery Cnty. v. MicroVote Corp., 175 E3d 296, 305 (3d Cit. 1999).
34 Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971,976- 77 (7th Cir. 1996).
35 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F3d 813, 817 (8th Cit. 2002).
36 United States v. Torf (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 357 F 3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2003).
37 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Lutheran Social Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
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privilege but a qualified privilege. Thus, even if a party has carried
its burden and demonstrated the applicability of the work product
doctrine that does not end the inquiry. The party seeking production
then carries the burden of showing the applicability of Rule 26(b)(3)
(ii), i.e., a substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and
an inability to obtain it by other methods without undue hardship.38
In applying this rule, courts make a distinction between ordinary or
"fact" work product and core or "opinion" work product. 39 Ordinary work
product has been defined as the "written or oral information transmitted to
the attorney and recorded as conveyed by the client."40 Such ordinary work
product may be obtained, despite the privilege, by meeting the above test.4'
But courts, based on the language of Rule 26(b) and the Hickman decision
itself, give special protection to core work product. "[A]bsent waiver, a
party may not obtain the 'opinion' work product of his adversary; i.e., 'any
material reflecting the attorney's mental impressions, opinions, conclusions,
judgments, or legal theories.' 42 Thus, core work product enjoys a greater
level of protection than ordinary work product, but even the extent of
that heightened protection is somewhat unclear. While some courts have
articulated an absolute protection to core work product, many others,
including the Supreme Court, have stopped short of affording it such status.4
B. The Work Product Rule Distinguished from Attorney-Client Privilege
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege and how it is Applied.-In diversity cases,
federal law mandates that state law governs the attorney-client privilege."
However, if the court's jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, the
attorney-client privilege is defined by federal common law.45 The elements
of the attorney-client privilege are satisfied "(1) [w]here legal advice of any
kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
38 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)( 3 )(ii); EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 811.
39 Advance Publ'ns Inc. v. United States (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing
Practices Litig.), 293 E3 d 289, 294 (6th Cir. zooz).
40 In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
41 Toledo Edison Co. v. G A Techs., Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1988); Castle v.
Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 E2d 1464, 1467 ( ith Cir. 1984) (per curiam). In this sense, the
work-product privilege is not an absolute privilege, but more akin to a qualified privilege.
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 797.
42 In re Columbia/HCA, 293 E3 d at 294 (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at
163-64).
43 EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 947-50.
44 FED. R. EVID. 5o1.
45 Id.
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by himself or the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived."4 A
more succinct statement of the privilege is that a party must show: "(1) a
communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in confidence;
(4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal assistance to
the client."47
There are a few notable exceptions to the privilege. Disclosure of
communications to third parties can lead to a waiver of the privilege. 48
Also, the communication must be for the purpose of securing legal
advice as opposed to securing general business advice.49 Where an in-
house counsel also serves in a business role, the inquiry can be difficult
and requires a hard look into whether the communication was made for
a business as opposed to a legal purpose. "Business communications
46 Banner v. City of Flint, 99 F. App'x 29 , 3 6 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Reed v. Baxter, 134
F.3 d 351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Bisanti, 414 E3d 168, 171 (ist Cir. 2005)(articulating a nearly identical standard).
47 EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 65 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 118 (Tentative Draft No.1, 1988)); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395
(1981) (discussing elements of confidentiality and communication); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in or-
der to obtain legal assistance are privileged.") (citations omitted); Colin P. Marks, Corporate
Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at
All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 158 (2006). Though individual state and federal courts have
articulated variations of this standard, these four basic prongs remain consistent. For instance,
the Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Investigation, described the elements as:
(I) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. SupP. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)). "Though this standard
adds some nuances, such as the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, the basic standard re-
mains the same. Furthermore, though this standard is articulated in terms of communications
from a client to an attorney, the privilege also covers communications from an attorney to a
client." Marks, supra, at 158 & n.I I (citing Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D.
6 15, 6 18 (D. Kan. 2oo I)).
48 United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358, 360-61 (D. Mass. 1950) (holding that the
privilege only applies where the communication was between the attorney and client without
the presence of third-party strangers); see also Marks, supra note 47, at 159.
49 UnitedShoeMach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 6o-6i ("Where a communication neither invited
nor expressed any legal opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of
business advice, it is not privileged." (citation omitted)); see also Marks, supra note 47, at 159.
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are not protected merely because they are directed to an attorney, and
communications at meetings attended or directed by attorneys are not
automatically privileged as a result of the attorney's presence."so Thus,
in cases where in-house counsel serves a dual legal/business role, courts
will look at the nature of the communication to determine whether the
primary purpose of the communication was to provide legal assistance.s'
2. Policy Justifications for the Attorney-Client Privilege.-The attorney-client
privilege has been described as one of the oldest existing legal privileges,
dating back to ancient Rome, where it was initially used as a means to
prevent an attorney from being called as a witness in his client's case.sz
The justifications for the attorney-client privilege have evolved over
the years. Today, the most commonly cited policy supporting existence
of the privilege is that open and frank communications with an attorney
50 Kramer v. Raymond Corp., Civ. No. 90-5026, 1992 WL 122856, at *I (E.D. Pa. May
29, 1992) (citing Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Bandag, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
At one time, many federal courts adopted a "control group" test to determine if communica-
tions between corporate employees and the corporate counsel were covered by the privilege.
See United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35,42-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (citation omitted). Under
this test,
the privilege applied if the employee making the communication was
in a position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation might take upon the advice of the attorney,
or if the employee was an authorized member of a body or group which
had the authority such that he, in effect, personified the corporation.
Marks, supra note 47, at 162. However, this approach was squarely rejected by the Supreme
Court in 1981 in Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 391-93. See also Nat'l Converting & Fulfillment Corp.
v. Bankers Trust Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 804, 8o6 n.I (N.D. Tex. 2001). Today, under federal law,
"communications from lower echelon employees are within the privilege as long as the factors
listed above are satisfied and the communications are made to the attorney in confidence to
assist him or her in giving legal advice to the client corporation." Marks, supra note 47, at 163
(citations omitted).
SI Kramer, 1992 WL 122856, at #1; MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, No.
03 Civ. 18i8PKLJCF, 2005 WL 3338510, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,2005); Avianca, Inc. v. Corrica,
705 F Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989). Two other notable exceptions are that underlying facts
are not protected, Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96; United States v. Rakes, 136 F 3 d 1, 3-4 (Ist Cir.
1998); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 E3 d 851, 862 (3 d Cir. 1994), and
the privilege does not apply to communications concerning an intended or continuing crime
under the crime-fraud exception.
52 JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATIORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.02-1.04 (3d ed.
2001). Wigmore described the privilege as being an accepted part of English law, however,
this notion has come under attack as being inaccurate and possibly was nothing more than
a makeweight to "distinguish [the attorney-client privilege] from those that Wigmore chose
to deprecate as 'novel privileges."' 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5472 (2d ed. 1986) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286,
at 536 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1986)).
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facilitate compliance with the law." Thus, the privilege exists to promote
full disclosure by the client and to foster a relationship of trust between
the attorney and the client.54 This justification has been labeled an
"instrumental" one in that the privilege serves as an instrument, or a
means to an end-that end being communications between attorney
and client." At its heart, this justification is based upon an assumption
that without the privilege clients will not disclose necessary facts to the
attorney." Thus, the privilege has been described from a cost-benefit
standpoint as cost-free to society as, without the privilege, the evidence at
issue would not have been disclosed and discoverable in the first place."
Not surprisingly, because the attorney-client privilege is based upon
an assumed benefit, it has been criticized as speculative and its value
has been called into question." This has caused some commentators to
offer up alternative, non-instrumental justifications for the privilege, such
as a "humanistic" privacy justification.59 Imwinkelried distinguishes this
justification noting, "the humanistic rationale does not rest on the factual
assumption of a causal connection . . . . Rather, the rationale is that it is
desirable to create certain privileges out of respect for personal rights
such as autonomy or privacy."" This privacy concern mirrors a primary
justification that is often cited when explaining the work product doctrine-
the benefits of having a "zone of privacy" within which an attorney can
work."1 Nonetheless, this humanistic policy justification has not overtaken
the instrumental justification, and the Supreme Court has continued to cite
53 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. Io6I, Io6I (1978) ("The privilege is also considered necessary to the lawyer's function
as confidential counselor in law on the similar theory that the legal counselor can properly
advise the client what to do only if the client is free to make full disclosure.").
54 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Palmer
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P2d 895, 904-05 (Mont. 1993).
55 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 5.1.1
(Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
56 Id.; Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,408 (1998).
57 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55. Interestingly, at one time, the paradigm for this justifica-
tion was in the context of a trial lawyer being consulted for the purposes of litigation, before
the rise of the in-house counsel, but the justification has been extended to the in-house
counsel context as well. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 52; Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 19 1, 267-68 (1989)
("Interestingly, for several decades of its common law existence, the attorney-client privilege
encompassed only communications relating to the litigation in which the lawyer's testimony
was sought. It was not until the mid-I8oos that the privilege was held to include communica-
tions relating to 'legal advice of any kind."' (citations omitted)).
58 WRIGHT & GRAHIAM, supra note 52.
59 Id; IMWINKELRIED, Supra note 55, § 5.1.2.
60 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, § 5.1.2.
61 See supra note 4.
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approvingly to the instrumental justification in recognizing new privileges."2
3. Coverage Under the Attorney-Client Privilege Versus the Work Product
Doctrine.-It has been said that the scope of the work product doctrine
is both broader and narrower than the attorney-client privilege.63 It is
broader in that it extends to materials beyond just communications.6 It
is narrower in that it only extends to materials created "in anticipation of
litigation."16 In some instances, this coverage may overlap. For instance, in
the hypothetical posited at the beginning of this Article in which litigation
over a client's product ensued, a memorandum prepared and given to the
client assessing the merits of the pending case or cases would likely have
dual coverage under both the attorney-client privilege (as the memorandum
is a communication) and the work product doctrine (as the memorandum
was created in anticipation of litigation). But returning to the documents
at issue in the introductory hypothetical, would there be any protection for
the drafts of a memorandum and attorney's notes in his or her file regarding
the possible legal liability? Any memoranda that are given to the client may
come under the protection of the attorney-client privilege, but drafts, notes,
62 IMWINKELRIED, Supra note 55; Jaffee v. Redmond, 5i8 U.S. I, 9-12 (1996); United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989).
63 Compare United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n. i (10975) ("[Tihe work-prod-
uct doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege."), and Advance
Publ'ns Inc. v. United States (In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.),
293 E3 d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.),
856 E2d 619, 624 (4th Cit. 1988), with In re OM Group Secs. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 579, 587 (N.D.
Ohio 2005) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is different than the work product doc-
trine). See also Fred A. Simpson, Has the Fog Cleared? Attorney Work Product and the Attorney-
Client Privilege: Texas ' Complete Transition into Full Protection of Attorney Work in the Corporate
Context, 32 ST. MARY's L. J. 197, 225-26 (2001) ("The work product doctrine provides a greater
area of protection than the attorney-client privilege. In spite of its broad application, work
product does not protect documents or tangible items not created in anticipation of litigation."
(citations omitted)); Kevin Mark Smith, Preventing Discovery of Internal Investigation Materials:
Protecting Onesef From One's Own Petard, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Aug. 2ooo, at 28, 35 ("Because the
work product doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorney-client privilege in that it only
applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an entity must next determine whether the
investigation is being conducted as a result of pending litigation." (citation omitted)); Kim
J. Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of United
States v. Kovel, 86 MARO. L. REv. 977, 989 (2003) ("The attorney work product doctrine is at
once broader and narrower than the attorney-client privilege.").
64 In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 304 ("[Tlhe 'work product doctrine is distinct from
and broader than the attorney-client privilege' and extends beyond confidential communica-
tions between the attorney and client to 'any document prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion by or for the attorney.'" (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir.
1986))).
65 Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, Whistleblower
Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 ALA. L. REV. 205, 2I6 (1999)
("The key to this protection is that the work must be performed in anticipation of litiga-
tion.").
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and possibly even research trails the attorney creates could all be subject to
discovery. Although these materials will all likely contain or reflect the mental
impressions of the attorney, they were created pre-launch, at a time when
litigation was remote. In other words, although the materials may represent
core work product, to fall under the protection of the work product doctrine,
even core material must be produced "in anticipation of litigation."6
This limitation can pose a significant problem for the transactional
attorney. As Professor Roger Kirst has noted:
It seems unlikely that a transaction document will be found to have been
created in anticipation of litigation as required by Rule 26(b)(3) to meet
the definition of litigation work product. That leaves the attorney-client
privilege as the obvious ground, so lawyers regularly rely on that privilege
and assert that the transaction documents they wrote or edited are
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the issue
in the federal caselaw on discovery of transaction work product has been
whether such material is privileged. The federal courts have almost always
held that the federal law of the attorney-client privilege does not protect
documents that do not reveal the client's confidential communications. 67
The case of Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp. illustrates the difficulty of
protecting attorney work product in a patent prosecution context.6' In
Hercules, Hercules sued Exxon for infringement of a patent that disclosed
a type of artificial rubber." During discovery, Hercules refused to produce
255 requested documents, claiming that the documents were protected
66 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2026 (3d ed. 20o)
("As with all assertions of work-product protection, opinion work product is guarded against
discovery only if prepared in anticipation of trial; mental impressions of an attorney in ser-
vice to other objectives, such as negotiation of a transaction, are not protected by the doc-
trine."); Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 82o; Duke T Oishi, A Piece of Mindfor Peace of Mind:
Federal Discoverability of Opinion Work Product Provided to Expert Witnesses and its Implications in
Harwai'i, 24 U. HAw. L. REV. 859, 864 (2002); Robert D. Stokes, Note, Discovering Investigative
Reports Under the Work Product Doctrine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, 159 (1982); Ettie Ward, The
Litigator's Dilemma: Waiver of Core Work Product Used in Trial Preparation, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
515, 516 n-4 (1988).
67 Roger W. Kirst, A Third Option: Regulating Discovery of Transaction Work Product Without
Distorting the Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 229, 230 (2000); see also United
States v. Naegele, 468 E Supp. 2d 165,170 (D.D.C. 2007) ("When there is no intent that the
communication remain confidential, the privilege does not attach." (citing United States v.
White, 950 F2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991))); In re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena
Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F3 d 16, 22 (ist Cir. 2003) ("The privilege protects only those
communications that are confidential and are made for the purpose of seeking or receiving legal
advice." (citations omitted)); Santrade, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 ER.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.C.
1993) (noting same); Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated September 15, 1983), 731 F.2d 1032, 1037(2d Cir. 1984) ("{The attorney-client]
privilege does not impede disclosure of information except to the extent that that disclosure
would reveal confidential communications." (citation omitted)).
68 Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
69 Id. at 141.
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by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. 0
The district court began its inquiry by classifying the documents into
categories such as "[diocuments relating to the prosecution of the
application for the patent in suit" or documents relating to a particular
interference suit." The court then analyzed the documents under the
attorney-client privilege finding that a number of the communications
were not covered by the privilege, in part due to the communications
not being premised upon the rendering of legal advice." The court then
turned to the work product doctrine, analyzing the documents in light of
the "anticipation of litigation" requirement." Although the court agreed
that an adversarial proceeding included a patent interference proceeding, it
stopped short of finding that a document prepared to aid in the prosecution
of a patent qualified under the "anticipation of litigation" requirement."
The scope of that privilege is still limited, however, by the requirement
that the document be prepared "in anticipation of litigation." The
prosecution of an application before the Patent Office is not an
adversary, but an ex parte proceeding. Although the process involves
preparation and defense of legal claims in a quasi-adjudicatory forum,
the give-and-take of an adversary proceeding is by and large absent."
Thus, the court held that a number of the documents, including drafts with
attorneys' handwritten notes, were subject to discovery."
Hercules demonstrates how documents, even ones that record the
mental impressions of attorneys acting in their legal capacities, will fail
to garner protection under the work product doctrine if litigation is not
anticipated. However, transactional attorneys are not the only ones facing
the prospect of their mental impressions being open to discovery. As has
already been noted, documents created in anticipation of a government
investigation, but prior to the commencement of the investigation, have
also been found to be beyond the scope of the work product doctrine."
70 Id. at 142.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 147-48. It is not entirely clear if the documents may have been subject to discov-
ery due to some other reason; the court discussed the argument that some of the communica-
tions may not have been to individuals covered by the privilege but dismissed this attack. Id.
at 145-47. The court then discussed the requirement that the attorney "is'acting as a lawyer'-
giving advice with respect to the legal implications of a proposed course of conduct" and then
concluded that on the basis of the foregoing, the following documents were not protected by
the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 147-48.
73 Id. at 150-51.
74 Id. at 151-52.
75 Id. at 152.
76 Id.
77 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 ER.D. 130, 158-59 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino v.
Felterman, 174 F.R.D. 59, 63 (W.D. La. 1997); see also In re Bank One Secs. Litig., First Chi.
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Indeed, even when a problem has arisen, documents may not be said to
be prepared in anticipation of litigation if the prospect is deemed remote.
For instance, in the case of In re GrandJury Subpoena," a case that in many
ways mirrors the hypothetical proposed in the introduction, a corporation
was under investigation by a grand jury for distributing adulterated and
misbranded medical devices in violation of provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).79 In 1998, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) initially approved the device at issue for manufacture, but prior to
and during the initial period of shipping the devices, it was discovered
that the devices were failing both in routine tests and in actual shipped
devices.80 After a series of calls involving the corporation's officers, attorney,
and the FDA, among others, the corporation decided to stop production
of the device."' The grand jury sought to compel the corporation's
attorney to produce the notes he took during these calls with the FDA."
The corporation and attorney resisted and sought a protective order,
claiming the notes were protected under the work product doctrine."
After an extensive review of the work product doctrine, including its
various applications in different jurisdictions, the court ultimately denied
the protective order, finding that the notes were not produced in anticipation
of litigation." What is striking about the court's decision, however, is its
rather blunt statement that the notes were classic core work product. The
court stated:
There can be little doubt that if prepared in anticipation of litigation, an
S'holder Claims, 209 F.R.D. 418, 425 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that documents prepared in
response to an investigation by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency were not protected
by the work product doctrine because the documents "were not prepared due to the anticipa-
tion of litigation, but rather [arose] from the evolution of business activities at Bank One as a
result of an OCC inquiry"); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sees. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that documents prepared by an audit committee in light of an SEC investiga-
tion were not protected by the work product doctrine because the investigation by the audit
committee was not conducted primarily in anticipation of litigation).
78 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 22o F. R.D. 130.
79 Id. at 133. To ensure that readers of the opinion could not learn the identity of the
corporation or other parties involved, the court created fake names such as XYZ Corporation.
Id. at 134-35, n.i.
8o Id. at 134.
8I Id. at 139-40.
82 Id. at 133.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 156-62.The court noted that the corporation and its attorney were in a "catch-22"
of sorts in that if they claimed they anticipated either a lawsuit or adverse FDA action, this
would be based on failures in the field of the device which would put the company out of
compliance with the FDCA and thus the notes could be discoverable under the crime-fraud
exception. Id. at 157-58. Ultimately, the court concluded that the corporation and attorney
had a weak anticipation showing and had also failed to show that the notes were produced
because of the prospect of litigation. Id. at 162.
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attorney's notes of conference calls between a client and a regulatory agency
are the sort of materials that the work product doctrine protects. Indeed,
they typically qualify as opinion work product, because "when taking notes,
an attorney often focuses on those facts that she deems legally significant."s8
Despite the fact that the attorney clearly took the notes to aid
him in fulfilling his duties to his client, the court nonetheless found
them discoverable. The court ruled that the notes were not generated
in "anticipation of litigation" as the FDA had not actually begun an
investigation and the prospect of private litigation was not likely at the
time the documents were created. 86
In both Hercules and In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the court recognized
that the documents sought reflected the mental impressions of an attorney
acting in his or her capacity as legal counsel; yet the courts denied protection
of the work product on an assumption that even core work product can only
be protected if it was generated "in anticipation of litigation."" This raises
a rather basic question of whether the assumption that the "anticipation
of litigation" requirement applies to core work product is correct or even
justified. The remainder of this Article discusses the origin of what is, in
fact, a misunderstanding of the protection that should be afforded to core
work product.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE WORK PRODUCT RULE
As with most articles that address the work product doctrine, a
discussion of the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor is in order.88 However,
a mere recitation of the Supreme Court's holding does not do justice to
the nuances of the rule or the purposes for which it was created. To truly
understand Hickman, it is necessary to set up the historical context in which
it was decided as well as the state of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as they existed at that time.
85 Id. at 155-56 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2o9 F.3 d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir.
2000)).
86 Id. at 157-62. [Tlhe possibility of litigation must be more than inchoate. Id. at 158.
87 Id. at 155-62; Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. 434 F. Supp. 136, 151-52 (D. Del. 1977);see
also Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 E2d 596, 603-o4 (8th Cir. 1977) ("That the con-
tents of the report constituted 'work product' cannot be denied; nor is there any question that
the report contained the mental impressions, conclusions and opinions of those who wrote it,
including their interpretations of what the interviews with individuals revealed. However, it
is obvious that Law Firm's work was not done in preparation for any trial, and we do not think
that the work was done in 'anticipation of litigation,' as that term is used in Rule 26(b)( 3 ), al-
though, of course, all parties concerned must have been aware that the conduct of employees
of Diversified in years past might ultimately result in litigation of some sort in the future.").
88 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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A. The First Rules of Federal Civil Procedure and Their Purpose
The first Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.9 Prior to the
adoption of these rules, discovery procedures were severely limited. The
adversarial process reigned supreme and gamesmanship was the order of
the day in litigation. 0 Thus, all discovery, including what would later be
termed "work product," was often unavailable to the other side except
in circumstances where a court might equitably find that compulsion was
required.91 It was in this setting that Roscoe Pound, then Dean of the
University of Nebraska's College of Law, gave a speech to the American
Bar Association questioning the propriety of a system that valued the
adversarial system over justice." This speech reportedly helped initiate
efforts that led to the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.93
The first rules covered a variety of matters, including discovery.
The rules represented a stark contrast to the gamesmanship that had
existed prior to their adoption, and indeed, it appears there were a
number of courts that were wary of them. 94 With regard to discovery, the
rules formally provided for when depositions could be taken and their
89 Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted); Furman v. Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353,355 (2d Cir. 1986); Henley v. FMC Corp., 189 F.R.D.
340, 349 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. i99) (citation omitted); Montalvo v. Hutchinson, 837 F. Supp. 576,
577 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In reWatford, 192 B.R. 276, 279 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996).
90 Marcus, supra note I I, at 326-27; see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 50-o (noting the "cumber-
some" methods of obtaining discovery prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
91 Marcus, supra note I I, at 326-27; Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 351, 360
(1987) ("Before the new rules, federal discovery was virtually nonexistent .... ").
92 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 4o5-o6 (1906); Marcus, supra note II, at 326 (quoting Pound, supra, at
404-05); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equiy Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 944-48 (1987).
93 Marcus, supra note i i, at 328 (quoting John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. PaulAddress
of ipo6: The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 176, 176 (1936).
94 Discovery Procedure Symposium: Before the 1946 Conference of Third U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, 5 F.R.D. 403, 418-19 (1946) [hereinafter Discovery Procedure Symposium] ("As I think
everyone in this room knows, under the old practice, before the Rules, the trial of a lawsuit
was more like a sporting proposition: If you got the better lawyer, you had a better chance
of winning; if you could conceal all the facts, you had a better chance of winning."); Marcus,
supra note i i, at 329 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217 n.6 (3d Cir. 1945)).
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scope,95 when interrogatories had to be served,' and for the production
of documents and things.97 Although these rules made exceptions for
95 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (1938) (amended 1948). Rule 26 read, in pertinent part:
(a) When depositions may be taken.
By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property which is the subject of the action or without such leave
after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether
a party or not, may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of
discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as
provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with
these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
(b) Scope of Examination.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d),
the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts.
Id.
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (938) (amended 1948). Rule 33 provided:
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories
to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or
private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered
separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interroga-
tories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party
submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the delivery of the in-
terrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for good cause
shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Objections to any interrogatories
may be presented to the court within i0 days after service thereof, with
notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be deferred until the
objections are determined, which shall be at as early a time as is practi-
cable. No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of
interrogatories to be answered by the same party.
Id.
97 FED. R. Civ. P 34 (1938) (amended 1948). Rule 34 provided:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may
(i) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any desig-
nated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects,
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privileged materials,98 meaning documents revealing attorney-client
communications would remain protected under the attorney-client
privilege, the rules made no exception for documents created in the course
of preparing for litigation. In the absence of a rule on point, courts soon
began to adopt a variety of approaches on how to deal with such materials.
Although the work product problem was not the only troublesome
issue faced by the first rules, it was certainly one of the most controversial
and the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules soon began to explore
language to address the issue." Courts dealing with objections to the
production of such materials generally fell into one of two camps. Some
courts held that such materials must be produced, regardless of whether
they were generated by an attorney or by a third party employed by the
party claiming protection.'" The Advisory Committee noted, however, that
a number of cases had protected such materials from discovery, although
the reasons were hardly uniform."1' As the Committee noted:
Thus it has been held by some courts that statements obtained from
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his pos-
session, custody, or control; or (2) order any parry to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the prop-
erty or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and
taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.
Id.
98 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1938) (amended 1948) ("[T]he deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action....") (emphasis added); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (amended 1948) ("[Tihe court ...
may (i) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing,
by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evi-
dence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody,
or control . . . .") (emphasis added).
99 Marcus, supra note i i, at 329; Walter P. Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F R.D. 339, 354-55 (1946).
100 Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y 1945); Blank v. Great N. Ry., 4
ER.D. 213, 214-15 (D. Minn. 1943); Sarmento v. Edwards Taxi Co. (In re Citizens Cas. Co.),
3 ER.D. 171, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Revheim v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 2 F.R.D. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Seligson v. Camp Westover, Inc., i F.R.D. 733, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Matthies
v. Peter F. Connolly Co., 2 ER.D. 277, 277-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F.
Supp. 350, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Kane v. News Syndicate Co., i F.R.D. 738, 739 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164, 165-66 (E.D.N.Y 1939); Bough v. Lee, 29 F. SupP- 498,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Kulich v. Murray, 28 F Supp. 675, 676 (S.D.N.Y 1939); Bough v. Lee, 28
F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); seealso Hickman v. Taylor, 153 E2d 212, 217-18 n.8 (3d Cir.
1945) (summarizing cases where discovery was permitted).
io Armstrong, supra note 99, at 5 F.R.D. at 457-59.
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witnesses, parties or others are not material as evidence, or are hearsay and
inadmissible, and discovery has been denied. . . . Some courts have also
emphasized what they thought to be the unfairness of letting the other party,
through discovery, obtain free of charge the material gathered or prepared
by his adversary; that to permit such a course would penalize diligence
and put a premium on laziness; and that discovery should not constitute
a "fishing expedition.". . . Some courts have held that it is improper to
seek any evidentiary matter gathered by or for the adversary party after
commencement of the action. . . . And a number of cases, as to particular
matters to be discovered, have either denied the discovery because no
reason or cause therefor was shown regarding the data sought, or denied
discovery on the general principle that no inquiry should be made into the
adversary's preparation of his case for trial. 0
Thus, courts were split as to what to do with material generated when
litigation was pending. It was within this context that the Hickman case
was decided.
B. Hickman v. Taylor at the Trial and Appellate Level
On February 6, 1943, a tug boat named the J.M. Taylor, owned by the
partnership of Taylor & Anderson, capsized and five of the seamen on board
were killed, including Norman Hickman."o3 Soon after the accident, Taylor
& Anderson hired an attorney, Mr. Fortenbaugh, to defend the partnership
in any subsequent suit that might arise in connection with the sinking of
the J.M. Taylor.'" On March 4, 1943, a steamboat inspector's hearing was
held where the four surviving members of the crew testified; immediately
after the hearing, Fortenbaugh interviewed these witnesses and obtained
written statements from them. 1 Fortenbaugh also interviewed other
relevant witnesses "and in some cases made memoranda of what they told
him." 106 Thereafter, settlements were reached with representatives of three
of the five dead seamen.'07
On November 26, 1943, Hickman's father, as administrator of his son's
estate, brought suit against Taylor & Anderson under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C.A. § 688, alleging his son's death resulted from Taylor & Anderson's
negligence.'os
102 Id. at 458-59 (internal citations omitted).
103 Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Marcus, supra note i i, at 332-
33.
104 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481; Marcus, supra note i i, at 333.
105 Hickman, 4 ER.D. at 481.
io6 Id.
107 Id.
io8 Id. at 480; Marcus, supra note I I, at 334. Curiously, the district court referred to
Hickman as the plaintiffs wife, which Richard Marcus points out is incorrect. Marcus, supra
note I I, at 334 n.43. As Marcus also points out, suit was also filed against Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad (B&O). Id. at 334. B&O was the owner of a sunken car float that the J.M. Taylor had
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Pursuant to Rule 33, the plaintiff requested that Taylor & Anderson
produce copies of any statements members of the crew made to
Fortenbaugh after the accident.109 Taylor & Anderson refused, claiming
that the interrogatory called for "privileged matter obtained in preparation
for litigation."no The district court subsequently held a hearing where
Fortenbaugh testified by deposition on how and why the statements were
made.'
In defending its refusal to produce the statements, the defendants cited
to Stark v. American Dredging Co.," 2 in which the district court denied a
request for production of witnesses' statements made in preparation for
trial."' Judge Kirkpatrick, sitting with an en banc panel from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, refused to recognize a broad, sweeping protection
from discovery of all things produced in anticipation of litigation. 1 4 In
doing so, the court first noted the liberal scope of discovery under the
Federal Rules: "The guiding principle is the broad conception of the
Rules that discovery of all matters relevant to a suit should be allowed
to the fullest extent consistent with the orderly and efficient functioning
of the judicial process."" The Hickman court distinguished the Stark
decision as simply recognizing that the Federal Rules granted the court
discretion to limit production, but it then disapproved Stark in that it
placed a burden on the party seeking production to show "good cause."1 16
The court reformulated the rule as "[u]nless, under the circumstances of
any particular case, the [c]ourt is satisfied that the administration of justice
will be in some way impeded, discovery will be granted when asked.""'
Turning to the statements at issue, the court first noted that any firm
been hired to tow across the Delaware River the night of the accident. Idat 332.
1o9 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 48o. The interrogatory read:
State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs
'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in
connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug
'John M. Taylor.' Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in
writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such
oral statements or reports.
Id. (quoting Interrogatory No.38).
i to Id. (quotation marks omitted).
I Id. at481.
I12 Stark v. Am. Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D. 300,302 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
113 Hickman, 4 ER.D. at 481.
114 Id. at 481-82 ("We do not regard [the Stark] decision as laying down a hard and fast
rule that statements obtained for [preparation for trial] are privileged, or exempt from produc-
tion for any other reason.").
1 15 Id. at 481.
i16 Id. at 482.
117 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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would conduct an investigation to determine its own ship's seaworthiness
and whether its employees were responsible."' Although the court did
not state so expressly, it appears that the court was implying that business
concerns could have driven the investigation. Whether the statements
were prepared in anticipation of litigation or not, the court felt that they
should be produced. Though the court noted that it could not compel
production of materials within the traditional boundaries of the attorney-
client privilege, it found that the statements to Fortenbaugh were not
covered by this privilege." 9 Without the protection of this privilege, the
court found that the statements should be produced under the broad
scope of discovery permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Interestingly, the court placed an important limit on this discovery;
the court limited discovery of Fortenbaugh's "mental impressions,
opinions, legal theories and other collateral matter" and held that the
court should review Fortenbaugh's materials and only produce those
portions "containing statements of facts obtained from witnesses which it
considers to be within the proper scope of discovery."12 ' The court thus
ordered production of the witness statements for the court to make such a
determination. 2 Taylor & Anderson and Fortenbaugh refused to produce
the statements and the assigned judge found them in contempt of court.'
The district court's ruling was appealed to the Third Circuit and
was heard en banc.1'24 As an initial matter, the appellate court noted that
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had indeed
introduced a sea change in the way discovery was to be conducted."' The
court summarized:
We must discard, for instance, the concept that there is something close
to a property right in the information which the lawyer digs up about the
client's case and has in his possession. We must also discard the notion that
questions from the other side can be fended off on the ground that the
opponent's lawyer is simply engaged in a fishing expedition. These notions
i 18 Id.
i19 Id. The court gives little explanation on this point but it is worth noting that the
status of the attorney-client privilege as it related to businesses was very much a matter of
debate until the Supreme Court case of Upjohn. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981). Under the Upjohn formulation of the rule, it is very possible that the statements made
to Fortenbaugh by the employees would be privileged. Seesupra Part II.B.i and note 46.
120 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 482.
121 Id. at 482-83.
122 Id.
123 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1945). This actually created a desirable
result for the defendants as the order to produce the statements, which normally would not
be eligible for interlocutory appeal, was now immediately reviewable. Id. at 214 n.i. Marcus,
supra note i i, at 336.
124 Hickman, 153 F.2d at 214.
125 Id. at 216-17.
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are hard to get rid of, but we take it that they are contrary to the idea of this
discovery portion of the Federal Rules.1 6
Despite the broad purpose of the Federal Rules in facilitating the
discovery process, the appellate court expressed concern over the unfettered
production of materials, which might impinge upon the attorney-client
relationship.' Of particular concern was the possibility that an attorney
could be called as a witness in the same case in which he was acting as an
advocate to verify the content of a witness statement. 'Although the Canons
of Ethics frowned upon such a situation, the appellate court noted that the
Federal Rules' "privilege" exceptions (which prevented the discovery of
privileged material) did not cover the statements at hand as third parties
made the statements and not clients.' 9 District courts addressing the issue
had split as to how to handle the production of such materials, leaving the
Third Circuit with no clear direction.'" Nonetheless, the court held that
"intangible things, the results of the lawyer's use of his tongue, his pen,
and his head, for his client," material that the court termed "work product
of the lawyer," were covered by the exception to privileged material under
the Federal Rules.'"' The Third Circuit justified this extension of the term
"privileged" on public policy grounds:
Those members of the public who have matters to be settled through
lawyers and through litigation should be free to make full disclosure to
their advisers and to have those advisers and other persons concerned in
the litigation free to put their whole-souled efforts into the business while
it is carried on. 32
C. Development of the Work Product Doctrine by the Advisory Committee and
under Hickman v. Taylor
While Hickman was working its way through the court system, the
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules was busy attempting to reach
126 Id.
127 Id. at 219-20.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 220, 222. As noted above, the statements from Taylor & Anderson's employees
could arguably be privileged under a modern construction of the attorney-client privilege. See
supra note I19 and accompanying text.
130 Id. at 22o n.13. The appellate court, in a lengthy footnote, summarized the varying
decisions and their reasoning. Id.
131 Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291
(John T McNaughton rev. 1961)). Wigmore advocated that the policy of the attorney client
privilege necessarily involves full disclosure; "[iln order to promote freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisors must
be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent."
WIGMORE, supra.
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a resolution via rule making to the work product problem.' At first, the
Committee adopted an approach that seemed much more in line with those
cases holding that broad discovery should be allowed into trial preparation
materials.13 4 In its first preliminary draft of amendments to the Rules,
proposed in 1944, the Committee's solution was to amend Rule 30(b) to
provide for protective orders against discovery "into papers and documents
prepared or obtained by the adverse party in the preparation of the case for
trial . . . ."'3 The burden, however, of seeking the protective order was on
the adverse party that was resisting the discovery request.3 6 One year later,
the Advisory Committee proposed a second draft, keeping the protective
order approach to work product materials but with a more expansive
explanatory note.'37 The note explained that the purpose of the rule was to
make clear that discovery of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
was permitted and such materials were not privileged, but that the district
courts would retain discretion to deny discovery into such materials via the
protective order.'38 However, as district courts were already divergent in
their approaches on how to handle such materials, the lack of direction on
how to exercise discretion as to whether to issue a protective order would
lead to confusion, a fact that the Committee recognized without resolution
at that time. 3 1
In 1946, the Committee, possibly in response to the vigorous debate
that centered around the treatment of trial preparation material, changed its
proposed amendment on how to treat such material. 4 0 The new proposal to
amend Rule 30, which was very similar to the language contained in today's
Rule 26(b)(3), read:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing
133 Anderson et al, supra note 7, at 771-72 (citations omitted).
134 Marcus, supra note I I, at 330.
135 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 43 0944) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT] (emphasis
omitted); Marcus, supra note I I, at 330; Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 772.
136 ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 135, at 43; larcus, supra note
I I, at 330.
137 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 43 (1945) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SECOND DRAFT], at 38-40 (1945);
Marcus, supra note I I, at 331 (citations omitted); Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 772 (citation
omitted).
138 ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SECOND DRAFT, supra note 137, at 39 (1945); Marcus, supra
note I I, at 331 (citation omitted); Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 772 (citations omitted).
139 ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SECOND DRAF, supra note 137, at 39-4o; Anderson et al., supra
note 7, at 772 (citation omitted).
14o Armstrong, supra note 99, at 356 (1946) ("There is no Amendment about which there
is a greater or stronger division of opinion among members of the Bar.").
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obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor,
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied
that denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party
seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or
will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the
production or inspection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as
provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.'4 1
This amendment was put forth without the opportunity for comment from
the bar,"1 2 but that is not to say that the Committee was without a clear
understanding of the conflicting views on how trial preparation materials
should be treated.143 Indeed, at a 1946 symposium on discovery procedures
held before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the same circuit from which
Hickman came), George Wharton Pepper, the vice-chairman of the Advisory
Committee, noted that the amendment the Committee arrived upon was
the result of debate between those who favored complete discovery and
those who favored complete exclusion of trial preparation materials.'" As
Mr. Pepper stated, "It seems to me, looking at the things as clearly as I can,
that what the Committee has attempted comes about as near as possible to
steering a middle course between two extreme views neither of which would
give anything like general satisfaction to the bar.""' How the Committee
came upon the exact language used is also not entirely clear, though it was
surely influenced by the district court decisions denying discovery based on
good cause,146 as well as the Hickman decisions themselves.'4 7 The language
141 Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, 5 F.R.D. 433,456-57 (946) [hereinafter Report of Proposed Amendments] (empha-
sis omitted); Armstrong, supra note 99, at 356.
142 Armstrong, supra note 99, at 340, 356.
143 Id. at 356 ("[The Amendment] may be that this is the best that can be done if a posi-
tion is to be taken between complete exclusion and complete discovery.").
144 Discovery Procedure Symposium, supra note 94, at 4o6-07. This symposium demon-
strates the heated debate between the opposing views amongst the Bar. Among the speakers
were Samuel Fortenbaugh, the attorney from Hickman (which at the time of the symposium
was on appeal to the United States Supreme Court), advocating in favor of exclusion, id at
408, and Mr. Abraham Freedman, who advocated in favor of discovery. Id. at 418-26.
145 Id. at 407.
146 See Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 141, at 458-59 (noting that a number of
cases had denied discovery "because no reason or cause therefor was shown regarding the data
sought, or denied discovery on the general principle that no inquiry should be made into the
adversary's preparation of his case for trial" and listing the cases).
147 Id. at 459-6o (discussing Hickman). In fact, the Committee expressed its doubts as to
the result of the Third Circuit's decision in Hickman, as the Committee believed that the term
"privileged," which the Circuit Court found to encompass trial preparation materials, was not
intended to be used so broadly. Id. at 460 ("The Committee believes that the term 'privileged'
as used in that rule was not designed to include anything more than that embraced within
the rule of testimonial exclusion regarding privileged communications as developed under
the applicable laws of evidence, both common-law and statutory."); Armstrong, supra note
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in the amendment may also have been influenced by English law, which
did not permit the discovery of trial preparation materials.14" Regardless of
how it struck the balance in its proposal, the Committee had come to what
it felt was a fair compromise; the decision was now left to the Supreme
Court to either adopt the rule or deal with the problem through judicial
decision-making via Hickman, which was on appeal before the Supreme
Court.14' The Court chose the latter.so
The Supreme Court granted certiorari based upon the divergence of
views in the district courts on how to deal with trial preparation materials
and cited to the Advisory Committee's Report on the problem.'"' After
initially dealing and dispensing with the procedural irregularity of how the
case came before it 52 the Court turned to the merits by first noting, as had
the district and appellate courts, that in keeping with the purpose of their
promulgation, the discovery rules were to be read liberally.s 3 The Court
noted, however, that discovery was not without limits and that privileged
materials would not be subject to discovery.154 Ultimately, the Court found
the materials at issue before it, the witness statements and Fortenbaugh's
99, at 356.
148 Discovery Procedure Symposium, supra note 94, at 414-i8 (statements of Mr. Thomas
E. Byrne and Mr. Harrison G. Kildare, both of the Philadelphia Bar, reciting English law ex-
cluding trial preparation documents). Mr. Kildare noted:
The time-tested English rule is embodied in effect in the first part
of the proposed Addition to Rule 30(b), as follows:
'The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writ-
ing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, in-
demnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial
Id. at 471. Mr. Kildare then criticized the qualification permitting the judge the discretion to
allow discovery. Id. at 418.
149 Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 141, at 460 (1946); Marcus, supra note i i,
at 331.
15o Marcus, supra note i i, at 338; Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement
Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of
CivilProcedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1969) [hereinafter Advisory Comittee,
Discovery] ("In deciding the Hickman case, the Supreme Court appears to have expressed a
preference in 1947 for an approach to the problem of trial preparation materials by judicial
decision rather than by rule.").
151 Hickman, 329 U.S. 495, 500 & n.i (1947).
152 Id. at 504-505. There was some question as to whether the case was even properly
before the Court as the plaintiff had not properly attempted to depose Fortenbaugh under
Rule 26; but, the Court chose to move forward with the case rather than force the plaintiff to
go through the empty formality of pursuing the correct procedural device. Id.
153 Id. at 507 ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation.").
154 Id. at 508.
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recollections of those interviews, were not protected by the attorney-client
privilege, and the word "privilege," as used in the Rules, did not extend to
material produced in anticipation of litigation."ss The Court held:
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions
in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary
here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the
federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective
cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney
secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.
Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications
and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories."'
Since the Third Circuit had found the materials to be "privileged," the
Supreme Court overruled the Third Circuit on this point.
Although the materials were not privileged, the Supreme Court still
found in favor of Taylor & Anderson (and Fortenbaugh)"' based on its
concern over the plaintiff's attempts to delve into the files of the opposing
attorney without any showing of necessity."' The Court concluded that
the plaintiff was able to obtain information from the interrogatories and
that nothing prevented the plaintiff from interviewing the same witnesses
Fortenbaugh had interviewed.' The Court found this particularly
disturbing because the plaintiff's justification for requesting the material
was to "help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that
he has overlooked nothing."" The Supreme Court thus created a new rule
that protected the work product of an attorney from discovery unless the
party seeking disclosure could prove necessity and prejudice."6 ' The Court
155 Id.
i56 Id.
157 Id. at 513-14.
158 Id. at 508-09.
159 Id.
16o Id. at 513.
161 Id. at 509 ("We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of writ-
ten statements and mental impressions contained in the files and the mind of the attorney
Fortenbaugh without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such
production would unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any hard-
ship or injustice."). The Court defined work product as including that which was reflected
in "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways . . . ." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. See
also In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (ist Cir. 1988) (citing
Hickman as the genesis of the "substantial need/undue hardship standard"); Sporck v. Peil, 759
F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Hickman as the creation of the substantial need and undue
hardship standard).
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did not stop there, however, and went on to make a distinction between
what it termed "non-privileged facts" and production of "oral statements
made by witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether presently in the form of his
mental impressions or memoranda."' 2 As to the latter materials, the Court
expressed doubt whether any showing of necessity could be made to
justify production but stopped short of giving such materials an unqualified
1 163immunity.
Reflecting upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman, a few points
are worth highlighting with regard to the scope and policy behind the
protection the Court afforded an attorney's work product. First, much of the
materials that were being sought, and with which the Court was concerned,
would be termed core work product in modern parlance. It also merits
pointing out that although the materials at issue in Hickman were prepared
in anticipation of litigation, the Court did not make "in anticipation of
litigation" a requirement for the protection afforded. Indeed, the Court
could have easily recognized this requirement, as it was before the Court
as a proposed amendment to the Rules; yet it chose instead to address the
issue through the Hickman decision, which made no such qualification.'" In
this vein, the Court did not confine its reasoning to the litigation context,
but instead, in justifying the protection, described a lawyer's role in terms
of "performing his various duties," protecting his "clients' interests" and
"giving . . . legal advice" as well as generally preparing the client's case.'6
The Court appeared to offer multiple justifications as to why the
protection was necessary. One of the most commonly cited was the "zone
of privacy" justification, where the Court stated:
In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system
of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests.'"
This justification is based on a balancing of the merits of having a well-
functioning adversarial system with open discovery. This "adversarial"
justification is also apparent in the Court's concern over Hickman's
162 Hickman, 329 U.S. at512.
163 Id. at5I2-513.
164 Id. at 51o n.9 (noting that the English courts had developed a privilege covering
"documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation"). However, the Supreme
Court did not make such a qualification in its own opinion. Id. at 510-12.
165 Id. at51o-ii.
I66 Id.
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counsel's admission that he only wanted to obtain the materials in question
to make sure he had not missed something;167 in other words, he wanted
the information so he could reap the benefits of Fortenbaugh's insight and
ability as a lawyer. This not only aligns with the concerns the Advisory
Committee articulated about achieving a proper balance between the
two opposing views (complete exclusion versus complete discovery) of
how such materials should be treated,'" but also seems to be a nod that to
allow the production of such materials "penalizes the diligent," and puts a
"premium on laziness," justifications that were sometimes used by district
courts to support denying production of work product materials.169
A second justification is the often-overlooked concern of the effect on
the legal profession itself and upon the attorney-client relationship. After
articulating the adversarial justification for the protection, the Court went
on to state:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness
and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice
and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.o
These considerations, which again seem to speak particularly to core work
product, bear much in common with the instrumental policy justifications for
having the attorney-client privilege."' The reference to not writing down a
thought or fact for fear of discovery reflects a concern that the interests of
a client would be negatively affected. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson
pointed out a further instrumental concern that production of such material
could have the undesirable effect of forcing attorneys to take the witness
stand in cases in which they are advocates," a concern that is mirrored in
the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege.
167 Id. at 513.
168 Armstrong, supra note 99, at, 356.
169 Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 141, at 458, 460 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Advisory Committee, in formulating its proposed amendment, rejected these
as tests for whether production should be denied. Id.
170 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 5 1 1.
171 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389(1981); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("[Tihe attorney-client privilege serves the
function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It
thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice."); Guy v.
United Healthcare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172, 177 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (quoting Weintraub, 471 U.S. at
348); Marks, supra note 47, at 157.
172 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516-17 (Jackson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 9938
ANTICIPATION MISCONCEPTION
III. PosT-HICKmAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. The Road to Rule 26(b)(3) and the Anticipation Misconception
Although the "anticipation of litigation" requirement was not articulated
in the Hickman decision itself, the requirement soon found its way into
district court opinions. The case of Redikerv. Warfield, a 1951 United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York opinion, appears to
be one of the earliest articulations of this requirement.' The plaintiff in
Rediker was an attorney who brought suit against Warfield and Scott, who
were also attorneys, and against the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development for allegedly interfering with a contract the plaintiff had
with Ulen Realization Corporation to collect a claim from the Government
of Iran.'74 The plaintiff issued interrogatories regarding communications
Warfield and Scott, as legal counsel for Ulen, had with International Bank."'
Warfield and Scott resisted, in part, on the basis that the interrogatories
would delve into material protected under the work product doctrine.7 6
The court, citing to little more than the Hickman decision, denied work
product protection and noted that the communications at issue "were not
in the course of preparation for trial [n]or does it appear that they were in
anticipation of prospective litigation.""' The court went on to distinguish
the case before it from Hickman on the basis that in Rediker the attorneys
were also the defendants."' The court, however, gave little explanation as
to why it was asserting an anticipation of litigation requirement other than
its broad citation to Hickman.
Despite that case's lack of explanation, the Harvard Law Review, in a
1961 student-written survey of developments in discovery law, cited to
the Rediker case (and only the Rediker case) to support the assertion that
"[although work-product protection is not limited to material gathered after
commencement of an action, it has been held to apply only when material is
obtained in anticipation of litigation.""' The "Developments Note" went on
to justify the requirement, claiming:
Since a lawyer who does not envision litigation will not anticipate discovery
requests, the fear of disclosure should not affect the way in which the material
173 Rediker v. Warfield, ii ER.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 195').
174 Id. at 126-27.
175 Id. at 127.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 128.
178 Id.
179 Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1030 (1961) [hereinafter
Developments Note] (emphasis added) (citing to the Rediker opinion as its only support for
the statement).
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is prepared. For example, if the owner of real property employs an attorney
to investigate the marketability of his title preparatory to offering it for sale,
it seems that the fruits of the lawyer's search should be fully discoverable
if litigation relating to a subsequent sale contract should eventuate. In such
circumstances, as in all those in which a lawyer is asked to assist in planning
future conduct, even though he might recognize the ever present possibility
of litigation, he is prompted chiefly by his responsibility to avoid embroiling
his client in controversy.'
This reasoning, however, is flawed. At best it is naive as to the nature of the
work of an attorney, and at worst it is circular. The reasoning is naive in that
it assumes that an attorney who is doing his or her job will not fear discovery
of work product because the work product was produced to avoid litigation
rather than to engage in litigation. Yet, the very same material that was used
to avoid litigation could just as easily assist an opponent in litigation as
notes made in preparation for litigation."' Indeed, the reasoning seems to
ignore the Supreme Court's admonition that "[wiere such materials open
to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten.. . . The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served."'s
The reasoning could be viewed as circular in that it seems to assume
that an attorney who does his or her job will not end up in litigation and so
there should be no fear of discovery. But for an attorney to best complete
the client's designated tasks, the attorney must feel free to make notes and
create work product without fear of discovery. Thus, for attorneys to do
their job they must work without fear of discovery, which can only be done
if they are doing their job. The break down of this reasoning may stem from
what Professor Kirst identifies as a fundamental misreading of Hickman.
The logic of the Developments Note is flawed at a fundamental level, because
it depends on combining two ideas the Supreme Court had carefully
separated in Hickman-whether the information is discoverable and
whether the information can be discovered from the lawyer's materials. In
Hickman the Court stressed that the information was routinely discoverable
as a matter of course from the client. The work product doctrine of Hickman
was a limitation on routinely discovering the information from the lawyer's
materials.'8 3
Despite the fact that the "Developments Note" cites no case to support
its reasoning, the Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit cited to it the very
18o Id.
181 Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 788 n. 175.
182 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
183 Kirst, supra note 67, at 274 (citations omitted).
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next year in Co/ton v. United States.'" Colton, based on the "Developments
Note" and the Redikeropinion, held that for work product protection to apply
the materials must be produced in anticipation of litigation.' In Colton,
Herbert and Mercedes Matters engaged Edward Colton, an attorney, to assist
them with their taxes. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) subsequently
investigated the Matters and issued Colton a summons to testify and
produce "copies of income tax returns, workpapers, correspondence files,
memoranda and all other data relating to the preparation and the filing
of Federal Income Tax Returns for or on the behalf of the Matters ...
.186 At an initial interview in response to the summons, Colton gave little
information and refused to hand over documents, claiming protection under
the attorney-client privilege.' Eventually, Colton agreed to answer some
questions but still refused to answer others or hand over materials based
upon the privilege.'88 The court considered first the claim of attorney-client
privilege and held that it did not protect many of the communications that
pertained merely to the time period of representation and other matters
that did not reflect legal advice.' The court then turned to the documents
that Colton claimed were protected as work product under Hickman. Citing
simply to Rediker and the "Developments Note," the court held that such
materials must be shown to be "collected or prepared in anticipation of
litigation ... to justify invocation of this rule." o
Although the Second Circuit adopted "anticipation of litigation" as
a threshold requirement, no other circuit courts appear to have adopted
this standard prior to 1970, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were amended to explicitly incorporate the work product doctrine and
the "anticipation of litigation" requirement into Rule 26(b)(3). However,
at least one circuit recognized that "anticipation of litigation" was not a
formal requirement under Hickman. In Natta v. Hogan, a number of parties,
including Phillips Petroleum Company, challenged the priority date of a
patent held by Montecatini.'l Montecatini sought to discover documents
that Phillips claimed were protected under the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine.'9 The trial court denied protection under
the work product doctrine because the documents were not prepared for
184 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cit. 1962).
185 Id. at 640.
186 Id at 634 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 Id. at 635.
188 Id. at 636.
189 Id. at 636-38.
190 Id. at 640 (citing Rediker v. Warfield, ii F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)); Developments
Note, supra note 179, at 1030).
191 Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 688 (ioth Cir. 1968).
192 Id. at 691, 693.
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possible litigation.193 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected
the trial court's premise that litigation was an essential element of work
product protection:
Nothing in Hickman v. Taylor suggests that the work product rule is limited
to preparation for proceedings in a court of record. The rationale for the
work product doctrine is the prevention of unnecessary interference with
the work of an attorney. An attorney's work in the patent law field should
be as much his own as it is in other areas of the law. The work product
claim cannot be brushed aside on the theory that the documents were not
prepared for use in litigation.'"
The court held that although many of the tests and experiments that were
conducted in connection with the patent application would be discoverable,
the hand-written notes of attorneys were not. The court found that
"[sluch materials prepared by an attorney during his consideration of a
legal problem are within the work product doctrine." 95
Although the Tenth Circuit appeared to approve of a standard for work
product that took into account whether the material reflected an attorney's
consideration of a legal problem regardless of whether it was in anticipation
of litigation, it could also be read to have simply not constrained work
product to "proceedings in a court of record."'" In other words, Natta may
have done nothing more than expand work product to other adversarial
proceedings. The tone and wording of its interpretation seem to suggest
otherwise, but in subsequent cases, such as the previously discussed
Hercules opinion, courts distinguished Natta on the basis that it involved
an interference proceeding, which was adversarial, and not simply the
prosecution of a patent.' If the Natta decision created a circuit split, it
seems to have gone unnoticed and courts have not questioned the origin of
the "anticipation of litigation" standard.
Indeed, by the time the Advisory Committee on the amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was ready to re-examine the work
product doctrine, it was not due to disagreement over the "anticipation of
litigation" requirement. Rather, the issue was over whose work product was
protected and the scope of Rule 34, which subjected discovery to a "good
cause" requirement,98 and how this applied, if at all, to the work product
193 Id. at 693.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 693-94 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)). Of the four hand
written documents the court considered, it only extended protection to one as the others were
not identified as being written by any particular attorney. Id. at 694.
196 Id. at 693.
197 Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F Supp. 136, 15 1-52 (D. Del. 1977) (citing In re
Narra, 48 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D. Del. 1969)).
198 FED. R. Civ. P 34 (1966) (amended 1970). Rule 34 read, in relevant part:
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doctrine.'9 Though the Advisory Committee had made some failed efforts
in the 1950s to address the issues raised by Hickman, it was not until 1967
that the amendments that led to the current rule began to develop.2"
An initial draft of the Committee's amendment attempted to solve the
recognized problems, in part, by making clear that work product protection
extended beyond simply the work of the attorney.2 0 1 But curiously, the
Committee's solution to the "good cause" problem was to simply lump all
work product together and subject it to the same standard-a "good cause"
standard. 02 The amendment read:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing of
good cause therefor, except that a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously given by the party seeking the statement may be
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties ... the court in which an action is pending may
(i) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or
control ....
Id.
199 Advisory Committee, Discovery, supra note 150, at 499-500. In developing a new rule
to clarify the work product doctrine, the Advisory Committee recognized the problems that
had arisen regarding the coverage of the work product doctrine:
The major difficulties visible in the existing case law are ()
confusion and disagreement as to whether "good cause" is made out by
a showing of relevance and lack of privilege, or requires an additional
showing of necessity, (2) confusion and disagreement as to the scope
of the Hickman work-product doctrine, particularly whether it extends
beyond work actually performed by lawyers, and (3) the resulting
difficulty of relating the "good cause" required by Rule 34 and the
"necessity or justification" of the work-product doctrine, so that their
respective roles and the distinctions between them are understood.
Id.
200 Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 782-83 (noting that the amendments were reject-
ed).
201 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 FR.D. 211, 225 (1967 )-
202 Id.
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obtained without such a showing.203
This solution was odd in that it seemingly ignored the Supreme Court's
statement in Hickman that such materials could only be discovered upon
a showing of necessity and prejudice.2 04' Furthermore, the one-size-fits-all
approach to work product materials failed to recognize the special protection
that the Hickman Court recognized should be afforded to an attorney's core
work product.0 s As one critic of the rule recognized, "[tihe source of error.
.. is in formulating flexible language to cover a//such materials, rather than
in dealing directly and specifically with what experience has taught-that
certain materials deserve more protection than others."2 0
In response to criticisms that the "good cause" standard would create
confusion based on the various meanings the courts had given the term,
the Advisory Committee altered the standard in Rule 26(b) to reflect the
trend in case law to require "more than relevance." 0 Thus, in keeping
with the factors stated in Hickman as to when trial preparation material
could be discovered, the Committee added that such material could only
be discovered upon a showing of "substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the case and inability without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."0 The Committee
also added language to protect the "[miental [i]mpressions, [clonclusions,
[o]pinions, and [1legal [t]heories [cloncerning the [1]itigation" of an
attorney or other representative of a party. 09 In doing so, the Committee
cited again to Hickman, however, the Committee failed to clarify the extent
of such protection.210 The.final language also failed to provide guidance
203 Id. It is perhaps worth noting that the 1946 Amendment also contained an "anticipa-
tion of litigation" requirement, which may have simply been carried forward when it became
time to amend the Rules. See supra Part III.C.
204 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509, 511-12 (1947); Fred A. Freund, Work Product,
Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, Address at the Ninth Annual Postgraduate
Conference of the Columbia Law School Alumni Association (Mar. 23,1968), in 45 F.R.D.
493, 494.
205 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.
2o6 Freund, supra note 204, at 494.
207 Advisory Committee, Discovery, supra note 150, at 500; COMM. ON PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, MINUTES OF THE JULY 17-19, 1969 MEETING OF
THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 (July 1969) [hereinaf-
ter COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JULY 1969], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/STo7-1969-min.pdf.
2o8 Advisory Committee, Discovery, supra note 150, at 500.
209 Id. at 5oI.
21o Id. It was noted in the meeting minutes of the Standing Committee that a question
regarding this provision was raised, though it is unclear whether the question was with regard
to the scope of the protection or some other matter. COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
JuLY 1969, supra note 207.
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as to the meaning of the term "anticipation of litigation.""' This term, as
previously discussed, has led to splits among district and appellate courts
as to its meaning."' Furthermore, a review of the documents explaining the
Committee's reasoning regarding the amendments reveals that the work
product doctrine was often simply assumed to be relevant only when in
"anticipation of litigation," but no discussion of the standard or why such a
limitation should apply also to core work product appears."'
B. The Supreme Courts Interpretations of the Work Product Doctrine
The Supreme Court has seldom discussed the scope or limits of the
work product doctrine since the passage of amended Rule 26. There are,
however, at least three post-amendment opinions that merit discussion:
United States v. Nobles,'14 Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier Inc.,"' and
Upjohn Co. v. United States.21 6 The first two offer insight into the Court's
view of the doctrine; however, it is the Upjohn decision that is the most
instructive, both in the Court's language and also in the way in which it
deals with core work product.
In Nobles, a defendant accused of armed robbery sought to impeach the
prosecution's two key eye-witnesses through statements they had previously
made to a defense investigator.2 1 'The statements were written down by the
211 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25 (1983) ("Rule 26(b)(3) does
not in so many words address the temporal scope of the work-product immunity, and a review
of the Advisory Committee's comments reveals no express concern for that issue.").
212 See supra Part II.A.I.
213 See, e.g., Advisory Committee, Discovery, supra note 150, at 499-500 (noting the major
difficulties with existing law but omitting any mention of core work product); ADVISORY COMM.
ON CIVIL RULES, Excerpts from the Tape of the May 1966 Meeting 30-31 (May 1966), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVo5-1966-min.pdf. The
following excerpt is an example of the assumption that core work product is only an issue
when litigation is pending:
Mr. Acheson: I thought Mr. Jenner was merely talking about
preparation in anticipation of trial and he said a lot of this is done before
there is any trial at all.
Mr. Jenner: Yes, there would be no counsel at that particular point.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added). See also COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JULY 1969, su-
pra note 207, at 3; ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, Excerpts from the March 1967 Meeting
6-7, 1-12 (Mar. 1967), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
NMinutes/CVo3-1967-min.pdf.
214 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
215 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983).
216 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Professor Roger Kirst also discusses
these three cases in his article which advocates for expanded protection for the work of the
transactional attorney. See Kirst, supra note 67, at 268-73.
217 Nobles, 422 U.S. at 227.
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investigator and made part of a written report."'" The prosecution sought to
inspect the report and the court denied the request. 1 9 However, the court
told defense counsel that if the defense called the investigator to the stand
to testify the court would order production of those portions of the report
relevant to the impeachment.z0 Defense counsel later sought to call the
investigator for purposes of impeachment but refused to share the report;
so, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify.2 ' The Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that compelling discovery of the report violated
both the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
(the criminal analog to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)). 2 2 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that neither the Fifth Amendment nor
Rule 16 was implicated.2  The Court considered the implication of the
work product doctrine under Hickman separately from Rule 16 and held
that the defendant had waived his protection when he sought to introduce
the testimony of the investigator.224
At first glance, the Court's discussion of the work product doctrine appears
rather unremarkable as far as its impact on civil litigation. Nevertheless,
there are at least two aspects of the opinion that are worth discussing.
First, the Court felt compelled to discuss the work product doctrine under
Hickman separate from application of Rule 16, thus recognizing that Hickman
has continued validity apart from the rules. 2  Second, the Court, in its
discussion of Hickman, stated, "the [Hickman] Court therefore recognized
a qualified privilege for certain materials prepared by an attorney 'acting
for his client in anticipation of litigation."'2 6 Some courts have taken this
as an endorsement that the work product doctrine only applies to materials
produced in "anticipation of litigation."z2 2 The Court's statement makes
218 Id. at 227-28.
219 Id. at 228-29.
220 Id. at 228 & n.3.
221 Id. at 229.
222 Id. at 229-30.
223 Id. at 234-35.
224 Id. at 239-40.
225 Id. at 238-39. The Court was compelled to do so as it found that Rule 16 only applied
to pre-trial discovery but that Hickman applied to both pre-trial discovery and discovery after
trial has begun. Id. at 235, 238-39. This was the subject of Justice White's concurrence, as he
took issue with limiting a trial court's discretion on evidentiary matters under Hickman. Id. at
243 (White, J., concurring).
226 Id. at 237-38 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947)). After making this
statement, the Court makes a string cite to, among other sources, the Harvard student note
discussed supra Part IV.A. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238.
227 See, e.g., United States v. Margolis (In re Fischel), 557 E2d 209, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1977)
("The limited work product immunity extends only to certain materials prepared by an attor-
ney in anticipation of litigation." (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. 225)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings of
June 16, 1981, 519 F. SupP. 791, 793 (E.D. Wis. 1981) ("[TIhe work-product rule only applies
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no such limitation, however, and could be read as nothing more than a
description of the context in which Hickman was decided.z"'
The Grolier case involved a request by Grolier Inc. under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) for documents the government generated
during an investigation of a subsidiary of Grolier that was subsequently
ended.229 Grolier's request was based on Exemption 5 of FOIA, which
protected from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency .... "230 The district court agreed that all of the
documents were protected under Exemption 5, some of which were due
to the work product doctrine. 3 ' The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, finding that the work product doctrine only protected
documents in an existing or potentially existing related litigation.232 Thus,
the issue before the Supreme Court was not one related to discussing
whether core work product could be protected in a non-litigation context,
but rather whether Hickman and Rule 26(b) allowed the work product
doctrine to extend to subsequent disputes, even if unrelated to the original
litigation .2 " The Court noted the lack of any clear guidance on the issue of
a temporal scope for the work product rule, but expressed its view that "the
literal language of the Rule protects materials prepared for any litigation
or trial as long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent
litigation." M Thus, the Court would seem to have expanded the protection
of the Rule, but the authority of this precedent was weakened by the
Court's decision to base its ruling on an independent construction of
Exemption 5 to FOIA.23 5 Though there is some inkling that the Court
favored a broader rather than narrower view of the work product doctrine,
the Grolier case does not answer the question of whether core work product
can enjoy protection when not generated in "anticipation of litigation."
The most instructive Supreme Court opinion issued since the adoption
of the 1970 amendment to Rule 26 is the Upjohn opinion. Though Upjohn
is most often known for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope
to documents prepared 'in anticipation of litigation."' (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238)); see also
Kirst, supra note 67, at 272 & n.2 12. As Professor Kirst correctly notes, these cases add the
word "only" which is not found in the Nobles statement. Id. at 272.
228 See Kirst, supra note 67, at 272 (noting also that the statement was dictum in that the
Court's decision rested upon waiver and not whether the report was created in anticipation
of litigation).
229 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1983).
230 Id. at 22 n.3 (citation omitted).
231 Id. at 22.
232 Id. at 23.
233 Id. at 24-25.
234 Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
235 Id. at 26; Kirst, supra note 67, at 272-73.
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of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context,"' the decision is
also relevant in interpreting the work product doctrine."' In Upjohn, the
petitioner, Upjohn Company, maintained that questionnaires its attorneys
sent to Upjohn employees were privileged.3 The questionnaires were
part of an internal investigation that began in January of 1976 to discover
whether subsidiaries had made payments directly to or for the benefit of
foreign government officials in order to secure government business.239
Upjohn's attorneys "also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire
and . . . [thirty-three] other Upjohn officers or employees as part of the
investigation."2 o Upjohn's in-house counsel described the interview notes
as follows:
My notes would contain what I considered to be the important questions,
the substance of the responses to them, my beliefs as to the importance of
these, my beliefs as to how they related to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how
they related to other questions. In some instances they might even suggest
other questions that I would have to ask or things that I needed to find
elsewhere. They were more than just a verbatim report of my conversation
with the-a report of my conversation in the interviews.24 1
In March of 1976, after the initial investigation was made, Upjohn made
a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
its Form 8-K disclosing that Upjohn had made questionable payments. 242
Subsequently, the IRS issued a summons demanding production of these
materials. 2 43 Upjohn declined to produce the documents on the ground
that the attorney-client privilege protected them from disclosure and that
they also constituted the work product of an attorney prepared in "antici-
pation of litigation."m2 The United States filed a petition to enforce the
summons in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, and upon the recommendation of the magistrate, the court or-
236 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981); ABA Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Attorney-
Client Privilege(2005), reprinted in 60 Bus. LAW. 1029, 1035 (2005); Marks, supra note 47, at 162;
Anthony B. Joyce, Note, The Massachusetts Approach to the Intersection of Governmental Attorney-
Client Privilege and Open Government Laws, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 957, 957 n.5 (2009).
237 See Kirst, supra note 67, at 268-71 (discussing the relevance of Upjohn to the work
product doctrine).
238 UpjoAn, 449 U.S. at 386-88.
239 Id. at 386.
240 Id. at 387.
241 United States v. Upjohn Co., No. K77- 7 Misc. CA- 4 , 1978 WL 1 163, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 23, 1978), revd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (citation omitted). It should be noted that the
in-house general counsel was also the vice president and secretary of the company as well as
a member of the board of directors. Id. at *2.
242 Id. at *3; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
243 UpjoAn, 449 U.S. at 387-88 (citation omitted).
244 Id. at 388.
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dered the production of the disputed materials.245 With regard to the claims
of work product protection, the magistrate expressed some doubt as to
whether the work product doctrine applied at all to a tax summons; but
even if it did, the magistrate found that the government had met its bur-
den of proving "substantial need and an inability without undue hardship
to obtain the information by other means." 2" The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit upheld the magistrate's ruling with regard to the work
product doctrine, stating in a footnote that the work product doctrine did
not apply to an IRS summons and made no further analysis on the topic."'
On appeal, the Supreme Court quickly dismissed the Sixth Circuit's
notion that the work product doctrine did not apply to a tax summons.- As
the magistrate had premised his ruling on a finding of "substantial need"
and "undue hardship," the Court continued its analysis, citing to both Rule
26 and Hickman.4 9 The Court began its analysis by quoting Hickman's poli-
cy reasons for establishing the work product doctrine, citing both the "zone
of privacy" language as well as the language deriding the effect disclosure
would have on the profession and the relationship with clients.zso It then
rejected the government's argument that even under Hickman necessity
could compel disclosure of core work product. The Court did so by distin-
guishing between ordinary work product and core work product, noting that
the caveat to disclosure in Hickman, "did not apply to'oral statements made
by witnesses . . . whether presently in the form of [the attorney's] mental
impressions or memoranda."'" The Court recognized that some courts, ap-
plying Hickman and Rule 26, afforded absolute immunity to such materials,
a standard the Court was unwilling to adopt or reject because it was suf-
ficient to merely remand on the basis that the Magistrate had applied the
wrong standard in requiring "substantial need" and "undue hardship."m25
The Upjohn opinion is instructive both for its semantics and for how
it treated the core work product issue. Semantically, it is instructive that
the Court cited to both the Hickman opinion as well as Rule 26 in explain-
ing the work product doctrine.5 ' The court also noted that Hickman's
policies had been "substantially incorporated" into Rule 26: a recognition
245 Id. The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn had waived the attorney-client privi-
lege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding. Id.
246 Upjohn, 1978 WL 1163, at *11-13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
247 United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 n.13 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd449 U.S.
383 (981).
248 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398.
249 Id. at 398-99.
250 Id. at 397-98.
251 Id. at 399 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947)) (alteration in
original).
252 Id. at 401-02.
253 Id. at 397-400.
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that Hickman was not fully incorporated into the Rule.2 54 Indeed, this is
consistent with the view that Hickman continues to have validity in cover-
ing intangible work product, while Rule 26, by its terms, only applies to
tangible work product."' It is also worth noting that, in articulating the
policies supporting the work product doctrine, the Court did not stop with
the commonly cited "zone of privacy" justification, but also went on to
articulate the beneficial effect the doctrine would have on the legal pro-
fession and the attorney-client relationship."s' Finally, the Court's dis-
tinction that ordinary work product, prepared "with an eye toward litiga-
tion," should be treated differently from core work product emphasizes
the special protection the Court felt core work product should receive.5 '
With regard to this last point, the Upjohn opinion is as insightful for
what it does not say as for what it does-namely, the complete lack of dis-
cussion of whether the work product at issue was prepared in "anticipation
of litigation." Consider the time period during which the interview notes
were created-from January 1976 to March 1976. This was prior to Upjohn
reporting to the SEC or IRS and was merely part of the company's own
internal investigation.zss In other contexts, lower courts have found such
material to be beyond the protection of the work product doctrine because
it was not prepared "in anticipation of litigation."' Yet, the Supreme Court
did not discuss this as a requirement in its analysis but instead moved for-
ward on the assumption that the material in question was work product. It
may be that this omission is simply because the parties did not raise the
issue nor did the magistrate address it. Given the timeline of events, how-
ever, it seems odd that the Court would remand when it could have simply
254 Id. at 398; Kirst, supra note 67, at 233 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 398).
255 In re Cendant Corp. Sees. Litig., 343 F.3 d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003); Whitlow v. Martin,
259 FR.D. 349, 354 (C.D. Ill. 2009); see Abdell v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8453 KMK
JCF, 2oo6 WL 2664313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2oo6); Am. Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States,
6o Fed. Cl. 493, 497 (Fed. Cl. 2004); Charles P. Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse:
Exposing the LegalAlchemy of Document Compilations as Work Product, 64 U. PIrr. L. REv. 639,658
(2003); EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 815; Marcus, supra note II, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., Supra
note I I, § 2024.
256 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-98, 400.
257 Id. at 399 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
258 See 2 LESLIE WHARTON ET AL., SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
COUNSEL § 33:32 ("The work product at issue had been created long before the contested tax
summons was issued, and even before Upjohn had filed the report with the government that
instigated the IRS's investigation." (citation omitted)).
259 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 22o F.R.D. 130, 156 (D. Mass. 2004); Guzzino v.
Felterman, 174 FR.D. 5 9 , 63 (W.D. La. 1997); EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 831; see also Imperato,
supra note 65, at 216 ("The key to this protection is that the work must be performed in an-
ticipation of litigation."); Smith, supra note 63, at 35 ("Because the work product doctrine is
narrower in scope than the attorney-client privilege in that it only applies when litigation is
ongoing or pending, an entity must next determine whether the investigation is being con-
ducted as a result of pending litigation.") (citation omitted).
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upheld the magistrate's ruling on the ground that the core work product at
issue was still subject to the "anticipation of litigation" requirement. Per-
haps what can be taken from this is that the Supreme Court was not ter-
ribly concerned with the temporal scope of the doctrine, at least where core
work product was at issue.2 60
IV. THE ANTICIPATION MISCONCEPTION
After reviewing opinions subsequent to Hickman as well as the
discussions regarding the formulation of Rule 26(b), it is clear that a
number of courts and commentators have assumed that Hickman intended
work product protection to apply only to material generated in "anticipation
of litigation."2 6' However, as has been shown, a careful review of Hickman
reveals no such requirement. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the Court's
discussion of core work product as well as the policy discussion justifying the
doctrine would seem to indicate that protection should be afforded to core
work product, regardless of any temporal or motivational link to litigation.
Indeed, much of the confusion surrounding this issue seems to stem from
the Harvard student's "Developments Note," which offered scant support
for its conclusion. 62 Thus, it could be said that courts and commentators
alike have been operating under an anticipation misconception in that they
have viewed the "anticipation of litigation" standard as a bar to protection
of core work product that does not meet this requirement.
This misconception may be understandable when the role of the
260 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that could have clarified this
portion of its ruling. In UnitedStates v. Textron Inc. &Subsidiaries, a very recent case decided by
an en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court held that "tax accrual
work papers" prepared by Textron's lawyers and others within Textron's tax department, were
not protected by the work product doctrine. United States v. Textron, Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577
F.3d 21, 30-32 (Ist Cir. 2009) (en banc). The "tax accrual work papers" at issue were created
to help Textron create a tax reserve from which to draw money should some of its positions
on its tax liability be incorrect. Id. at 23. The court recognized that such papers could reveal
the "soft spots" on Textron's tax return should the tax return be litigated. Id. (quoting United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984)). However, looking to the motivational
component of the "anticipation of litigation" requirement, the court held that the creation of
the work papers was motivated by financial and business concerns rather than for use in future
litigation. Id. at 27-28,31-32. Textron filed a Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending the Filing
of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, see Textron, Inc.'s Motion to Stay the Mandate Pending
the Filing of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Textron, Inc. & Subsidiaries,
577 E3d 21 (Ist Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2631) (on file with author), however, on May 24, 2010,
the Supreme Court denied the petition. Textron, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, No.
09-750, 201o WL 2025148 (May 24, 201o). For an excellent review of the Textron district court
opinion, see Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Tax
Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy of United States v. Textron, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 337,
342-54 (2oo8).
261 Seesupranote3-
262 See supra notes 179-83.
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lawyer is viewed historically. At the time of the Hickman decision, in-
house counsel only made up roughly three percent of all attorneys, and the
work performed by these attorneys was rather routine. 63 Litigation and
trial work were more closely associated with the work of an attorney than
transactional or prophylactic legal work.2M Indeed, up until the mid-1800s
the attorney-client privilege was limited to trial work."' However, the
number of in-house counsel had grown to 10.3 percent by 1970,66 and by
then "anticipation of litigation" as a requirement had already taken hold.
Today, it is commonly understood that the role of the attorney expands
beyond just trial work into complex transactional work, which may or may
not ultimately require litigation.
A second, related misconception is also worth noting with regard to
Hickman. It is often written that the policy justification for the work product
doctrine is that the attorney requires a "zone of privacy" within which to
work.167 This justification is a nod to the benefits viewed to result from
a robust adversarial system. To cite only to this adversarial justification,
however, ignores the Hickman court's further statements concerning the
detrimental effect the disclosure of work product materials would have on
the legal profession as well as the attorney-client relationship.6 In this
regard, the work product doctrine's justification has much in common with
the justification that is the foundation of the attorney-client privilege,
which is not tied to any litigation requirement. 69 Indeed, even the cost-
free nature of the privilege may apply to the work product doctrine. Instead
263 THE OXFORD COMPANION To AMERICAN LAW 500 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002) (stat-
ing that "[in 1948, only (three] percent of all lawyers were employed in private industry," and
the role of the "in-house" attorney, up until the 196os, was traditionally to handle routine legal
issues while leaving more complex legal issues for outside counsel).
264 See id. ("Corporate counsel traditionally acted as business counselors and advisors to
their employers concerning routine legal issues; more complex legal issues were handled by
the corporation's outside counsel.").
265 Alexander, supra note 57.
266 VERN COUNTRYMAN ET AL., THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 tbl.2 (2d ed. 1976). This
growth appears to have been a steady incline growing from 5.5 percent in 1951 to 8.9 percent
in 1960. Id.
267 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 784, 789 (Fed. Cl. 2006)
(asserting that the work product doctrine is intended to preserve a "zone of privacy" where an
attorney "can prepare and develop [his] legal strategy"); Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949
(7th Cir. 2oo6) (identifying the purpose of the work product doctrine as establishing a "zone
of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client's case free from scrutiny or
interference by an adversary" (citations omitted)); Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 372
F.3 d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating that the work product doctrine "serves to provide a
'zone of privacy' within which to... plan ... [for a] case" (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); United States v. Adlman, 134 F-3d 1194,
1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating the purpose of the work product doctrine is to preserve a zone of
privacy in which an attorney can prepare his or her case).
268 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-13 (1947).
269 See supra Part II.B.2.
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of communications not existing absent the privilege, the cost-free nature
is present in the Supreme Court's statement that "much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten."2 7 0
A. Correcting the Anticipation Misconception
In light of these misconceptions, a simple fix is possible: eliminate the
"anticipation of litigation" requirement for core work product. This can be
accomplished by simply extendingHickman, which continues to have validity
today despite Rule 26(b), and recognizing that core work product should
retain a residuum of protection even outside of the litigation context."'
This would require a complete elimination of the temporal analysis and
a modification of the motivational analysis. Instead of looking to whether
the motivation for creating the work product is litigation, the test should be
whether the work product sought was generated by the attorney to provide
legal assistance. This admittedly would mimic the test for whether a
communication is protected under the attorney-client privilege, but given
the similar purposes of the doctrines, this is a logical test.72 Though this
may seem like a rather drastic proposal, a similar expansion already exists
under California state law 7 3 and at least one commentator has advocated
for recognition of such an expansion to protect the work of transactional
attorneys.27 4
270 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 51 1.
271 EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 815; Marcus, supra note I I, at 349-50; see Cercone, supra
note 255, at 658; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2024-
272 See MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, No. 03 Civ. 18i8PKLJCF, 2005
WL 3338510, at #I (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (citations omitted); Kramer v. Raymond Corp., Civ.
No. 90-5026, 1992 WL 122856, at *I (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1992) (citations omitted); Avianca, Inc.
v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989) (citations omitted); Cercone, supra note 255,
at 658; EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 815; Marcus, supra note II, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note I I, § 2024.
273 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2018.030(a) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.) ("A writing
that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is
not discoverable under any circumstances."); Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.
App. 4 th 819, 833 (Ct. App. zooo) (citation omitted) (interpreting California's work product
rule); Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th Io, I o (Ct. App.
1997) (citations omitted); Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 143 Cal. App. 3d 81o, 815-16 & n.7 (Ct.
App. 1983) (citation omitted) (contrasting the California rule with the federal rule).
274 See Kirst, supra note 67, at 230-35. Though Professor Kirst's article is equally criti-
cal of the "anticipation of litigation" requirement, and shares a similar line of reasoning as to
its analyses of Hickman and Upjohn, the Kirst article focuses much more on a recognition of
a transactional privilege based on a more extensive review of the attorney-client privilege.
Kirst, supra note 67. This article does not limit the scope of protection to a transactional privi-
lege and is based more on the historical and philosophical development of the work prod-
uct doctrine. For a contrary view of the work product doctrine, see Elizabeth Thornburg,
Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (1991), in which Thornburg argues that the
work product doctrine should be eliminated entirely.
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Such recognition of a residuum of protection would be in line with
the policy justifications of Hickman on both instrumental and adversarial
policy grounds. With regard to the instrumental justification as to core or
"opinion" work product, if the reasons for granting a qualified privilege
within the litigation context holds true, then those reasons should apply
equally to such materials outside the litigation context. As the Supreme
Court noted in Hickman, there could be a chilling effect on the attorney-
client relationship and "much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten.""s Furthermore, clients come to attorneys for help both
inside and outside of the litigation context, and the lawyer's role outside of
the litigation context is no less important. As one California appellate court
articulated in explaining its legislature's own decision to expand the scope
of coverage:
[Pirotecting attorneys' work product when they act in a nonlitigation legal
capacity furthers the important goal of reducing the likelihood of litigation.
Although all litigators are attorneys, the converse is not true. Nevertheless,
"Itihe lawyer, when acting as a counselor, performs a function that is
extremely beneficial to society, in that effective legal counseling minimizes
the likelihood of conflict between parties by stabilizing relationships and
promoting understanding and cooperation. Effective legal counselors
provide the 'solvents and lubricants which reduce the frictions of our
complex society.' In the role of counselor, the lawyer serves as an instrument
of peace."1 6
To limit the protection of core work product only to the litigation context
ignores this important policy justification for the rule as enunciated in
Hickman. 277
The expansion is also in line with the adversarial justification given
in Hickman. The "zone of privacy," which recognized that attorneys must
work without fear that the opponent would gain important insight into his
or her strategy decisions is applicable even at stages when litigation is only
a remote possibility. Indeed, the core work product of an attorney who is
engaged to avoid litigation, even at an early stage when no litigation is on
the horizon, can still give helpful insight into how a party will prepare its
275 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
276 Rumac, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 816 (quoting Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor
and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 685, 69o-69 (1982)); see also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20th CENTURY 461 (2002) ("Lawyers, in the main, ser-
vice business. They help form corporations, they advise on corporate affairs, they maneuver
through tangles of red tape; they cope with federal, state, and local government; they help put
deals together.").
277 This instrumental justification is important as it continues to have validity, at least
in the Supreme Court's view, in modern times. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S.
399, 408 (1998); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, 1 1-12 (1996); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554, 562 (1989); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55 § 5.1.1 (citing Steidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. 399;
Jaffee, 518 U.S. I; Zolin, 491 U.S. 554).
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case or into the strategy that will be used at trial. The following example
is illuminating:
For instance, an attorney who prepares a memorandum on the strengths
and weaknesses of a contract he has drawn up for a client might modify
his handling of future memoranda if he knew such documents were
routinely discoverable. The memorandum, if discovered, could provide
some unforeseen adversary with insights into weaknesses that he had not
detected on his own.278
A recognition that a residuum of protection remains under Hickman would
help alleviate this concern.
B. Justifications for Retaining the "Anticipation" Requirement
Despite the strengths of the arguments favoring the expansion of work
product protection, there are a number of countervailing arguments that
should be addressed. The first is the argument that an attorney working in
a non-litigation context will have no fear of discovery and thus no chilling
effect on his work product will occur. This was the reasoning put forth
in the previously discussed "Developments Note" that appears to have
helped establish the "anticipation of litigation" requirement.2 79 As has
already been explained, the "Developments Note's" reasoning seems naive
at best, particularly in light of modern legal practices. Attorneys engaged
in any arena of modern day transactional work, such as negotiating and
reviewing contracts, drafting wills, administering tax advice, or working
on patent prosecution, are aware that litigation may ensue. Indeed, given
the relative permanence an attorney's work has in modern times thanks to
electronic storage, this justification for retaining the requirement as to core
work product has little bite.
Another, more compelling argument against removing the requirement
is that it cuts against the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The original Federal Rules were enacted to open discovery up so that
cases were won or lost based on justice rather than gamesmanship. To cut
back on discovery in such a way could open up opportunities for abuses by
parties and a return to the gamesmanship that marked the pre-Rules era.
This argument would be more persuasive if what was being proposed was
a complete abandonment of the "anticipation of litigation" requirement.
The expansion argued for is only with regard to the core work product
of the attorney. The "anticipation of litigation" requirement makes sense
278 Anderson et al., supra note 7, at 788 n.175. The footnote prefaces that "[a]lthough
Rule 26(b)(3) focuses on litigation, there is no reason to believe that the Hickman rationale is
so limited. Arguably, the courts should protect a broader range of attorney work product." Id.
The footnote concludes, however, that protection could be available through the attorney-
client privilege or a protective order. Id.
279 See supra notes 179-83.
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as to "ordinary" work product and is in line with the balance struck as to
the adversarial nature of the work product exception. Placing a burden
for discovery on a party seeking "ordinary" work product outside of the
litigation context would be overly burdensome and potentially could
heighten the gamesmanship that was inherent in the system prior to
enactment of the Federal Rules. However, as to core or "opinion" work
product, if the justifications for granting a qualified privilege articulated
in Hickman are believed, then the benefits of protection outweigh the
negative effects feared."o
This leads, however, to possibly the strongest argument against such
a change. If the expansion of the work product doctrine is to rely upon
the instrumental policy justification that is shared with the attorney-client
privilege, then it must also suffer from the weakness of this justification,
i.e., that the perceived benefits of the protection are speculative at best.
Indeed, the work product doctrine may be more susceptible to such an
attack in light of our legal system's continued survival without such an
expansion. It is difficult to say that much of what is written down would not
be, and that the expansion is necessary to avoid a detrimental effect on the
attorney-client relationship when no such expanded protection has been
afforded to core work product for approximately the last eighty years.z8 '
To this, there are a number of responses that can be offered. First,
28o Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-13. It should be noted that even under such an expansion of
the work product doctrine, the exceptions of waiver and the crime-fraud exception could still
apply, further limiting the perceived damaging effects such protection would have on an open
discovery system. Contra Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4 th
I 10, 120 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d
1240, 1249 (Ct. App. 1988), and noting that, under California law, though waiver applied to the
work product rule, the crime-fraud exception did not).
281 A corollary to this argument would be that protective orders are available under Rule
26(c) to protect work product that is not covered under 26(b). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); cf.
Alexander, supra note 57, at 408 ("If a claim of corporate privilege is overridden because of the
particular evidentiary needs of the litigants, the court should be receptive to the corporation's
request for a protective order to minimize the risk of dissemination of the attorney-client
communications to the public or to parties in other proceedings."). However, as has already
been demonstrated, despite the availability of such a measure, problems have persisted as to
the discovery of core work product. Indeed, the Rule itself speaks in terms that do not lead
the reader to think that simply by virtue of having core work product status, that protection
should be granted. The Rule states, "[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought
may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending .... The court may,
for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding
the disclosure or discovery . , . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). Also, the presence
of a "good cause" justification is problematic as this was the precise language the Advisory
Committee rejected as unacceptable with regard to protecting work product due to confusion
as to the meaning of the language. See supra Part III.C. In fact, a court could simply return to
the "anticipation of litigation" analysis to determine if a protective order was justified. See, e.g,
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 133, 146-51 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying request for
protective order as the material at issue was not produced in anticipation of litigation).
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though the instrumental justification is one justification for expansion
of the doctrine, it is not the only one. The expansion of the doctrine is
also in line with the adversarial justification articulated in Hickman, as
has been noted above. Indeed, it is interesting to note that although the
attorney-client privilege has long stood upon the speculative instrumental
justification, one of the primary alternative justifications that has been
offered for its continued existence is a humanistic privacy justification,
which would seem to mirror the adversarial justification given for the work
product doctrine. 8
Furthermore, while there has been no protection for such materials in
the past, today's legal environment is much different from the one in which
Hickman was decided, or the one in which the current version of Rule 26(b)
was effected, or even the legal environment of ten years ago. This is due
to both the growth of the legal profession.as a whole and in the in-house
sector, as well as the advent of electronic discovery ("e-discovery"). In
1948, the time of the Hickman decision and when the Federal Rules were
under consideration for amendment, in-house counsel accounted for 3%
of all attorneys 8 3 of which there were approximately 200,000 (placing the
number of in-house at approximately 6,000).2 The work of these in-house
attorneys was relatively routine but through the years grew to encompass
increasingly complex matters . 2 " By 1970, the year in which the work
product doctrine became a part of the Federal Rules, the total number of
attorneys had grown to 355,242 of which 11% worked in-house (placing the
number of in-house counsel at approximately 39,076).286 This percentage
leveled out over the next few decades, with in-house representing 10% of
the total number of attorneys in 1980, of which there were 542,205 (placing
the number of in-house at approximately 54,000),287 8% in 1995 (with a
total number of approximately 71,349 in-house)2 8 and 8.4% in 2000 (for a
total number of in-house counsel of 75,954).289 In 2008, the total number of
attorneys in the U.S. had reached 1,014,000 and although no percentage of
282 See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
283 THE OXFORD COMPANION To AMERICAN LAw, supra note 263.
284 See GLENN GREENWOOD, AM. BAR FOUND., THE 1961 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 88
(1961) (placing the total number of attorneys in the U.S. in 1952 at 22I,605).
285 THE OXFORD COMPANION To AMERICAN LAW, supra note 263, at 500, 505; VERN
COUNTRYMAN ET AL., supra note 266, at 41, 44.
286 BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 12 (1985); VERN COUNTRYMAN
ET AL., supra note 266 (placing the percentage at 10.3 percent).
287 CURRAN ET AL., supra note 286, at 12; FRIEDMAN, supra note 276, at 461.
288 CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1995 7 (1999).
289 CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 28 (2004). The total number of attorneys in the U.S. had grown to
over I million. Id. at 27.
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in-house counsel number appears available yet,290 if the percentage remains
in the 8-10% range, this would place the number of in-house counsel
somewhere between 81,120 and 101,400. Even going by a conservative
estimate, this growth represents a significant increase in the raw numbers
from 1948, and over a doubling of the number of in-house counsel since
1970. When the advent of e-discovery is coupled with this growth in the
numbers and use of in-house counsel, there is a great likelihood that, as
a practical matter, materials exist today that simply would not have been
discovered at the time of Hickman.
The advent and regular use of computers and electronic storage of
materials has created an environment in which every key stroke is recorded
and recoverable. Notes, drafts, and other material, which may very well
have disappeared in hard copy, particularly after a few years, either through
a document destruction program or simply by accident (we all know
how unorganized some attorneys can be), are now discoverable through
e-discovery measures. This has led to a large increase in the amount of
discoverable information."' It has also led to an increase in the ability to
easily search through vast amounts of information to discover previously
difficult to locate documents and information .2  As one commentator has
characterized it, "[tlhe data mountain is no longer an impossible height to
scale, but a vast database to be mined for secrets and insights that were
previously unavailable." 93 Based on the above, two significant changes
have occurred since Hickman; first is the increase in proportion and sheer
number of lawyers used in-house (and for increasingly complex matters).
Second, although the proportion of attorneys may have steadied by the
time the work-product doctrine was recognized in Rule 26(b), the nature
of discovery has changed dramatically since that time. Thus, if discovery
of core work product was not a concern as a practical matter at the time of
Hickman or in 1970, the same certainly cannot be said today."
290 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S, DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 2oo8 tbl.6, http://www.bis.gov/cps/race-ethnicity-2oo8_6.htm (last
modified Dec. 4, 2009).
291 Tracey L. Boyd, The Information Black Hole: Managing the Issues Arisingfrom the Increase
in Electronic Data Discovery in Litigation, 7 VAND. J. ENTr. L. & PRAc. 323, 323-25 (2005) ("Without
question, the amount of [electronically] discoverable information greatly exceeds the quan-
tity that is available through traditional discovery." (citation omitted)); Steven C. Bennett &
Thomas M. Niccum, Two Views from the Data Mountain, 36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 607, 607-08
(2003); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is
Rule34 Up to the Task?41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 349 (2ooo).
292 Bennett & Niccum,supra note 291, at 6io-I I.
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294 For example, a review of the number of ALI/ABA published CLEs regarding dis-
covery reveals a substantial increase since 1988, with the largest increase coming since 2004.
See www.westlaw.com (search "American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing
Legal Education (ALI-ABA)" database by inputting "ti(Discovery) & da(1988)" to find the
number of ALI/ABA articles with the word "discovery" in the title; repeat for every year up
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Finally, although it can be argued that the benefit is speculative, there
is evidence, both anecdotally and by analogy, from studies done in the
attorney-client privilege context that suggests otherwise. Anecdotally, it is
not difficult to find attorneys with war stories about discovery battles and
guarding against what was said or written down to avoid a paper trail that
an adversary could later discover.2 95 Empirically, there is some support that
the attorney-client privilege provides more than "speculative" benefits. In
2005, the Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) conducted a survey of
its members to determine whether the attorney-client privilege was under
attack by governmental agencies. 296 Of the 363 respondents to the ACC
to 2oo9). As the chart below demonstrates, the results of this search show that the number of
articles with "discovery" in the title greatly increased starting in 2004-illustrating that more
emphasis is being put on issues of discovery in the legal community This increase may very
well be related to the 2oo6 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involving
electronic discovery, which were being discussed prior to their effective date. Indeed, a review
of the titles from 2004 onward reveals that a number of the CLEs included the words "elec-
tronic" or 'e-discovery"in their title.
Number of ALl/ABA Articles with "Discovery" in
the Title on Westlaw
30
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295 JOHN WILLIAM GERGACz, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 7-10 (2d ed. 1990) (noting
that without the protection, in the litigation context, counsel would "be forced to balance the
benefit of creating work product with the risk that his adversary can readily obtain it").
296 Ass'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL SURVEY: IS
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER ATTACK? I available at http://www.acc.com/legalre-
source.cfm?show 16315. Additionally, in his 1989 survey concerning the effects, if any, of the
attorney-client privilege, Professor Vincent Alexander found that with respect to corporate
representatives, 62% of in-house counsel, 88.5% of outside counsel, and 75% of executives
said that the attorney-client privilege encourages candor. Alexander, supra note 57, at 246
tbl.4. While this survey is over twenty years old, and therefore not necessarily a representation
of circumstances today, the conclusions it draws, along with the conclusions promulgated by
the Association of Corporate Counsel in their 2005 survey, provide a strong basis of support
for the contention that the attorney-client privilege provides more than speculative benefits.
Compare Alexander, supra note 57, at 414 (stating that the evidence gathered in Alexander's
study contained more evidence than any other study to date that the attorney-client privi-
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survey, 93% believed that senior-level employees of corporate clients were
aware of the attorney-client privilege and relied upon it when consulting
corporate counsel. 97 This number dropped to 68% for mid and lower-tier
employees."' Significantly, however, 95% of the respondents believed that
absent the attorney-client privilege, there would be a chilling effect on the
flow of information from clients. 99 The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers conducted a similar study around the same time, which
also found that 95% of its respondents felt that if the attorney-client
privilege did not protect its communications or work product, there would
be a chilling effect on the candid flow of information. 00 Furthermore, 94%
of respondents believed that the privilege enhanced the likelihood that
company employees would discuss difficult issues of legal compliance
with the attorney and 97% believed that the privilege enhanced the
"lawyer's ability to monitor, enforce, and/or improve company compliance
initiatives.""o' These surveys, however, were of the attorneys and not of
clients and could themselves be attacked as speculative (in that the attorneys
are speculating upon what their clients would or would not reveal) and
self-serving. 02 It may be, on this front, that until a convincing empirical
study is completed the benefits derived from the attorney-client privilege
remain "speculative;" but, given the above justifications for expanding
the coverage as to core work product, this flaw should not be fatal. This is
particularly true given that the attorney-client privilege has existed on this
same speculative benefit for many decades.
A final argument that could be made against the adoption of recognizing
a residuum of protection for core work product is that it will be subject to
abuse-that attorneys will become mere tools by which powerful clients,
such as corporations, can protect documents from exposure simply by
having attorneys work on matters, be they related to the attorney's legal
expertise or not. As an initial response, I would again point out that
lege encourages candor in communications between an attorney and his client), with Ass'\ OF
CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra, at 2-3 (finding, just as Professor Alexander did twenty years ago,
that a vast majority of attorneys believe there would be a chilling effect on candid communica-
tion without the attorney client privilege).
297 Ass'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 296, at 2-3.
298 Id.
299 Id.
3oo NATL Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NATIONAL AssocIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS SURVEY: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IS UNDER ATTACK I-3, avail-
able at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/o/6oad77fc8d473b7885256feIo0742727/$FILE/Atty
Client Priv.doc.
301 Ass'N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, sulpra note 296, at 2-4.
302 This possibility was recognized by Professor Vincent in his 1989 survey in which he
noted that the "bias of the participants must be taken into account in weighing the accuracy
of the results.... One may reasonably suspect ... that the role of the privilege as an incentive
to candor was exaggerated by the participants." Alexander, supra note 57, at 263.
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recognizing a residuum of protection would not mean an abandonment of
exceptions to the work product doctrine such as the crime-fraud exception
or waiver. A corporation or client that wishes to utilize an attorney to commit
a fraud would still be subject to producing the resultant work product.
Furthermore, just as is true with the attorney-client privilege, simply using
an attorney would not lead to protection under the work product doctrine.
An attorney would still need to generate the work while providing legal
assistance (and the privilege could still be qualified). Thus, involving an
attorney in routine business matters would not lead to protection. While
it is true that recognition of a residuum of protection could lead to the
expanded protection of certain documents, this proposal is not intended
to completely displace the balance struck with a system of open discovery.
Instead, recognition of a residuum of protection would strike a proper
balance, within the dictates of the Hickman decision, between having a
system of open discovery and retaining a level of protection for documents
under both a humanistic privacy justification and also an instrumental
justification. While some may take issue with such an expansion and re-
balancing, citing the need for more rather than less discovery, many of
the criticisms that could be levied against such an approach could easily
be levied against the Hickman decision itself. However, as valid as such
criticisms may be, the battle to do away with any level of protection for work
product has been fought and lost long ago. Recognition of a residuum of
protection would merely do away with the arbitrary lines that are currently
being drawn regarding "anticipation of litigation."
CONCLUSION
The anticipation misconception has lingered for far too long. Rather
than attempt to stretch the existing attorney-client privilege to include
core work product or broaden "anticipation of litigation" to encompass
any work the attorney created, however speculative the litigation may
be, a sounder approach would be to simply recognize that a residuum of
protection exists under Hickman that provides a separate protection for core
work product. This is possible through the original Hickman decision itself,
which even today has validity despite the existence of Rule 26(b). The
recognition that core work product is protected, even if that protection is
not absolute, despite the absence of potential litigation, is more in line with
the dual policy justifications the Court articulated in Hickman. The first of
these policy justifications, to provide a "zone of privacy" to promote the
adversarial system, is advanced by a rule that protects core work product.
Without this rule, even when litigation may be remote, the attorney's
mental impressions could just as easily be used against the attorney's clients
in a litigation context as documents produced explicitly in anticipation of
litigation. Removing the "anticipation of litigation" requirement for core
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work product will also promote the second, instrumental justification given
by the Supreme Court. This justification, rooted in concerns that without
protection there would be a detrimental effect on the attorney-client
relationship and much of what is written down would not be written down,
shares much in common with its cousin, the attorney-client privilege. Just
as the attorney-client privilege is not tied to litigation, neither should the
protection of core work product. While the benefits may appear speculative,
on balance this benefit has been sufficient to justify the existence of other
privileges. The work product doctrine has the added benefit of having a
dual reasoning in its first adversarial justification, which is similar to the
humanistic privacy justification that has been offered for the attorney-
client privilege.
Furthermore, the term "anticipation of litigation" has failed to yield
a uniform or satisfactory definition-a problem that should concern both
practitioners and academics alike. To demonstrate, imagine that fictional
companyABC Corp., prior to any formal governmental investigation, assigns
in-house counsel to investigate possible accounting irregularities. In-house
counsel begins researching cases and statutes and makes notes regarding
how such authorities could affect the company's liability. While doing this,
in-house counsel also sets up a schedule to interview employees and third
parties over a four-week period. Two weeks into the interviews and while
research is still being done on the legal issues, the SEC and Department
of Justice begin a formal investigation. In some jurisdictions, the work
product from the first two weeks, including the attorney's notes from the
interviews, would not be protected, as the possibility of litigation was remote.
However, work completed during the second two-week period, after the
formal investigations had begun, would be covered as in "anticipation of
litigation." Such a distinction makes little sense and creates an incentive
for in-house counsel to avoid writing down his or her mental impressions.
Thus, eliminating the "anticipation of litigation" requirement for core
work product in favor of a rule that simply protects such documents will
help promote uniformity and provide attorneys with a degree of certainty
about whether their work will be protected. The inconsistent opinions
that have resulted from the "anticipation of litigation" requirement have
led to results that make distinctions without any true meaning. Simply
recognizing that core work product is deserving of protection regardless of
the prospect of litigation, so long as it is truly part of an attorney's provision
of legal services, should, at the very least, provide courts with the ability to
grant or deny protection in a more rational manner.
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